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The Convergence of Financial and ESG Materiality:
Taking Sustainability Mainstream
Ruth Jebe*
Boise State University
Sustainability reporting can be seen as an attempt to bring improved environmental, social, and
governance (ESG) practices to mainstream business. However, this movement to mainstream is
hampered by the disconnect between financial and ESG information. Both reporting streams use
the concept of materiality to shape firms’ disclosure obligations, but the term carries different
meanings for different organizations. One sustainability organization, the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board (SASB), has developed reporting standards to merge sustainability
and financial information by leveraging the definition of materiality for financial reporting
purposes. This use of financial materiality positions SASB to collide with the Security and
Exchange Commission’s (SEC) hands-off attitude to ESG reporting. In the regulatory void left
by the SEC’s inaction on sustainability reporting, SASB provides the best route to
reconceptualize materiality in line with society’s interest in sustainable business.
Introduction
In 2014, Securities and Exchange Commission commissioner Daniel Gallagher publicly denounced attempts by “third
parties” to influence the U.S. financial reporting regime. 1 According to Gallagher, shaping this disclosure system was
the exclusive domain of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 2 The Commissioner specifically called out
the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), a U.S. non-profit organization that creates sustainability
reporting standards, 3 stating it should be remembered that “groups like SASB have no role in the establishment of
mandated disclosure requirements.” 4 This, even though SASB bases its disclosure standards on exactly the same
definition of material information as does the SEC. 5
Corporate disclosure is defined by the concept of materiality, embodied in the requirement that firms disclose material
information. 6 The definition of materiality has historically been controlled by the government, which focuses on a
narrow concept of materiality confined to economic information. 7 Sustainability organizations, however, have argued
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1
Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at the 26th Annual Corporate Law Institute, Tulane University Law School: Federal Preemption of
State Corporate Governance, Sec. Exchange Commission (March 27, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch032714dmg.html
[hereinafter Gallagher Speech].
2
Id.
3
The terms “sustainability,” “environment, social and governance (ESG),” and “corporate social responsibility” reporting have all been used to
refer to reports with emphasis on environmental, social, or governance issues and to distinguish these reports from mandated financial disclosures.
For example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) defines a “sustainability report” as a report about environmental and social impacts. GLOB.
REPORTING
INITIATIVE,
What
is
Sustainability
Reporting?
https://www.globalreporting.org/infnormation/sustainnablityreportingn/Pages/default.aspx (last visited April 29, 2019). Others equate a corporate social responsibility (CSR) report with a sustainability report.
See E-CSR, CSR Report – Definition, Meaning, Benefits & examples of companies/Official & simple definition of a CSR report, https://ecsr.net/definntions/csr-report-important-examples/#what-is-the-defintnion-of-a-csr-report (using the GRI definition of sustainability reporting for
CSR reporting)(last visited April 27, 2019). Still others identify the common theme of disclosure of environmental stewardship, social
responsibility, and corporate ethics in these reports, regardless of nomenclature. Georg Kell, Five trends that show corporate responsibility is here
to stay, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 13, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-businenss/blog/five-trends-corporate-social-responsibilitygloval-movement. For simplicity, this article uses the terms “sustainability” and “ESG” interchangeably to refer to environmental, social, and/or
governance factors or reports.
4
Gallagher Speech, supra note 1.
5
See infra notes
and accompanying text.
6
See infra notes 43–48 and accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 43 – 61 and 170-179 and accompanying text.
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for a companion materiality concept that includes ESG information. 8 Disagreement over the definition of materiality
have resulted in financial and ESG disclosure occupying separate domains, a result that hampers mainstreaming of
sustainability by keeping ESG factors separate from business operations.
The separation of financial and ESG reporting can be pegged to different facets of materiality. The SEC represents
the compliance aspect of materiality, wherein the government uses the concept to define specific legal obligations.
The SEC’s adherence to the traditional definition of materiality as encompassing solely financial information purports
to reflect the investor protection focus of U.S. securities law and sets the threshold for complying with the legal duty
to provide information to investors. 9
Investors, on the other hand, represent the market aspect of materiality. Although ostensibly intended to protect them,
investors show dissatisfaction with the traditional definition of materiality. 10 Increasingly, investors recognize the
financial relevance of ESG issues, such as how companies respond to climate change, whether effective water
management is in place, how companies manage their supply chains, and whether they have effective workplace safety
policies. 11 Though once the domain of specialized socially responsible investing, mainstream investors now pursue
ESG integration, where ESG impacts are factored into financial analysis. 12 However, attempting to integrate
sustainability factors, as disclosed in a sustainability report, with financial factors, as disclosed in mandatory financial
reporting, has proved unsatisfactory. Investors need disclosure that clearly identifies which ESG factors impact
financial performance 13 and need that disclosure in a form that is “decision-useful.” 14
Unique among sustainability organizations, SASB calls for convergence of ESG and financial disclosure by leveraging
the existing definition of materiality for financial reporting—the same definition used by the SEC. 15 Use of the same
materiality definition should make SASB and the SEC allies. As Commissioner Gallagher’s comments show,
however, the SEC looks askance at SASB’s efforts to bring ESG factors within the ambit of materiality. Gallagher’s
remarks may be read superficially as reflecting an aversion to third party influence on the SEC, as an attempt to protect
the SEC’s regulatory province. At a deeper level, the rift between the SEC and SASB indicates diverging
understandings of the world. Although both organizations adhere to the same definition of materiality, that definition
carries different meaning for each organization.
This article argues that SASB’s use of materiality is an attempt to reconstruct the meaning of materiality to bring about
the convergence of financial and ESG reporting. Part I describes the origin and development of the seemingly simple
term materiality as it relates to corporate disclosure, and charts the differing meanings ascribed to the term. In Part II,
the article uses the concept of social constructionism to examine what the diverse uses of materiality indicate about
societal expectations. The article then identifies in Part III the conceptual and institutional obstacles to changing the

8

See infra notes 72–84 and accompanying text.
Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform – The SEC is Riding Off in Two Directions at Once, 71 BUS. LAW. 781, 786 (2016); Cynthia A. Williams,
The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1204 (1999) (noting that existing language
could include social disclosure).
10
See, e.g., Rachel Fixsen, Institutional Investors Dissatisfied with Companies’ ESG Reporting, IP&E (Nov. 16, 2016),
https://www.ipe.com/news/esg/institutional-investors-dissatisfied-with-companies-esg-reporting/www.ipe.com/news/esg/institutional-investorsdissatisfied-with-companies-esg-reporting/10016201.fullarticle; Ben Maiden, Investors Press for SEC Rule on ESG Disclosure, IR MAG. (Oct. 10,
2018), https://www.irmagazine.com/esg/investors-press-sec-rule-esg-disclosure (describing petition for rulemaking).
11
Georg Kell, The Remarkable Rise of ESG, FORBES (Jul. 11, 2018, 10:09 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgkell/2018/07/11/theremarkable-rise-of-esg/#1d05df221695; Christopher P. Skroupa, High ESG Performance Translates Into High Financial Performance, FORBES
(June 16, 2017, 02:06 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherskroupa/2017/06/16/high-esg-performance-translates-into-high-financialperformance/#78f787f8d708 (noting that two-thirds of institutional investors believe it is possible to build models showing the relationship between
ESG factors and financial performance).
12
Skroupa, supra note 10 (defining ESG integration); ESG Versus SRI: Successfully Aligning Your Investments and Values, RBC WEALTH MGMT.,
https://www.rbcwealthmanagement.com/cn/en/research-insights/esg-versus-sri-successfully-aligning-your-investments-and-values/detail/
(last
visited Apr. 7, 2019) (distinguishing SRI from ESG investing); Julie Gorte, The Financial Performance of Sustainability: ESG and Risk, PAX
WORLD FUNDS (Jan. 18, 2019), https://paxworld.com/the-financial-performance-of-sustainability-esg-and-risk/ (reviewing key ESG issues
associated with financial performance). In 2018, funds that invest based on sustainability criteria passed the $1 trillion mark. Attracta Mooney,
Rising Investor Interest Pushes ESG Funds Past $1tn, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/f1e98ec7-083e-3b95-8c6becc4810b988e.
13
Skroupa, supra note 10.
14
Maiden, supra note 9.
15
See infra notes
and accompanying text.
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meaning of materiality, focusing on the deference accorded administrative agencies as an obstacle to change. The
article concludes by reviewing SASB’s strategic positioning and prospects for advancing toward its goal of the
convergence of financial and sustainability reporting.
I. The Development of Materiality
The question of defining materiality in the U.S. has its origin in the creation of the mandatory financial disclosure
regime. Later, as groups sought disclosure of ESG information, they brought their own concepts of materiality, some
of which challenged the existing definition. This section provides an overview of the development of materiality from
the early twentieth century to the present.
A. The Role and Significance of Materiality
The concept of materiality is significant to business along two aspects. First, materiality has compliance implications.
Securities regulation in the U.S. is based on information disclosure, with materiality as the guiding principle. 16
Materiality acts to set information disclosure thresholds, 17 separating what should be disclosed from what could be
disclosed as part of required reporting. 18 For example, the line items on Form 10-K are presumptively material for all
listed companies, while Item 303 (the Managers’ Discussion and Analysis) leaves application of the term to the
reporting firm. 19 Thus, the government uses materiality to construct the legal obligation of listed companies to disclose
information. Historically, the use of materiality has been defined to include strictly financial information. 20
In addition to this compliance aspect, materiality also has a market aspect and is increasingly important in accessing
capital. The U.S. securities disclosure regime was instituted in the name of investor protection, with the government
definition of materiality presumed to serve investor interests. 21 Developments in the investing terrain call this
presumption into question. While the SEC has demonstrated little interest in the disclosure of ESG information, the
investing community increasingly wants this information. Two examples are illustrative. Many institutional investors
are signatories to the UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UN PRI), pledging to incorporate ESG factors into
their investment decisions. 22 The UN PRI has over 2,300 investor signatories to the Principles. 23 In addition to
institutional mechanisms such as the UN PRI, individual investor actions also signal the importance of ESG
information to them. BlackRock Investments releases each year a letter to potential investees, discussing global trends
of importance to the firm in making its investment decisions. 24 These letters frequently cite environmental and social
issues as affecting decision-making. 25
These examples show that, while the government uses materiality to shape legal obligations, investors use materiality
to encapsulate the sum total of information they actually deem important for investment decisions. Investors recognize
the impact of sustainability factors in three areas of business value creation.

16

See infra notes 40-46, and accompanying text.
Chloe Ghoogassian, Note, Evading the Transparency Tragedy: The Legal Enforcement of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 11 HASTINGS BUS.
L.J. 361, 377-78 (2015); Robert G. Eccles & Tim Youmans, Materiality in Corporate Governance: The Statement of Significant Audiences and
Materiality 4 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 116-023, 2015).
18
Amy Deen Westbrook, Sunlight on Iran: How Reductive Standards of Materiality Excuse Incomplete Disclosure Under the Securities Laws, 7
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 13, 18, 23-24 (2011).
19
See Miller, infra note 41, at 1654; see also notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
20
See infra note 71, and accompanying text.
21
Karmel, supra note 8, at 781.
22
About the PRI, UN PRI, https://www.unpri.org/pri/about-the-pri (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). The UN PRI was launched in 2006 specifically to
encourage investors to commit to incorporation of sustainability factors into investment decisions and to provide an information-sharing forum for
development of best practices. Id.
23
Id.
24
BlackRock is the world's largest asset manager with close to $6 trillion in assets under management in 2018. Josh Friedman & Noah Buhayar,
BlackRock Seeks $10 Billion to Buy Stakes in Companies, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 14, 2018, 6:29 PM; updated Feb. 8, 2018, 11:20 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-08/blackrock-is-said-to-seek-10-billion-to-buy-stakes-in-companies.
25
See, e.g., Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s 2019 Letter to CEOs, Purpose & Profit, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investorrelations/larry-fink-ceo-letter?cid=ppc%3ABlackRock_USWA%3Agoogle%3Asitelinklarryfinkletter&gclid=EAIaIQobChMI0uKEgY284QIV0RZ9Ch287QN0EAAYASABEgJVq_D_BwE&gclsrc=aw.ds (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
The 2019 letter specifically identifies environmental risks and opportunities as part of BlackRock’s engagement strategy for the year. Id.
17
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Cost Reductions and Efficiency
Basic information on energy management, greenhouse gas emissions, and water and raw material usage helps investors
gauge a firm’s efficiency, especially as it may be affected by resource scarcity (for example, in the case of water) or
future regulation (for example, imposition of a carbon tax). In 2008, private equity firm Kohlberg Kravis Roberts &
Co. L.P. (KKR) created a Green Portfolio program, which recognizes how poor environmental and social performance
has direct impact on company value. 26 The KKR Green Portfolio is comprised of companies chosen as representing
“opportunities that improve both financial and environmental performance in KKR’s portfolio companies.” 27
Risk Assessment and Management
Investors understand that ESG factors signal volatility and risk in a variety of ways. 28 For example, investors are
becoming attuned to the issue of stranded assets. 29 Stranded assets are assets that have undergone unanticipated or
premature devaluation, often as a results of environment-related risks. 30 Fossil fuels provide an example of this risk
as estimates suggest that a significant proportion of fossil fuel reserves, with a value in the trillions of dollars, would
be considered “unburnable” if the world is to avoid disastrous climate change. 31 Failure to address potential stranded
assets poses clear risks to the financial health of the company. Companies may also face new regulatory risks
associated with sustainability impacts. The Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions on conflict minerals highlighted the social
impact of the mining of certain minerals that are crucial inputs for many electronics. 32 Businesses were sensitive
enough to the reputational risk of having to make the disclosure contemplated by the Act that they mounted a
constitutional challenge to the reporting requirements. 33 Last, the insurance industry, whose polestar is risk
management, is investigating the impact of ESG risks on its business. Recent developments include a UN-led initiative
to create insurance underwriting guidelines for ESG risks. 34
Lost Opportunities
Companies that ignore ESG issues may also miss out on opportunities for market growth. Consumer preference for
sustainably produced goods is growing, as is evidenced by so-called green products and practices, 35 as well as the
growth of the Fair Trade movement. 36 Product certifications encompassing environmental and/or social criteria
26

See Partnering with our Portfolio, KKR, http://www.kkr.com/responsibility/esg-management/partnering-our-portfolio (last visited Apr. 9, 2019)
(providing current environmental and social topic initiatives, including green solutions, worker safety, and responsible sourcing).
27
KKR, KKR’s Green Portfolio Program Continues Global Expansion (May 23, 2012), available at https://ir.kkr.com/node/26701/pdf (identifying
Program companies’ cost savings as $365 million for the first three years of the Program). In 2015, based on the success of the original Green
Portfolio Program, KKR expanded the mandate of its ESG efforts and rebranded the initiative as the Green Solutions Platform. Elizabeth Seeger,
Building on the past, focusing on the future: Green Solutions Platform, KKR (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.kkr.com/global-perspectives/kkrblog/building-past-focusing-future-green-solutions-platform.
28
ROBERT G. ECCLES & MIRTHA D. KASTRAPELI, THE INVESTING ENLIGHTENMENT: HOW PRINCIPLES AND PRAGMATISM CAN CREATE
SUSTAINABLE VALUE THROUGH ESG 6 (2018). For argument that accounting for both financial and nonfinancial risk can drive firm and portfolio
performance, see Virginia E. Harper Ho, Risk-Related Activism: The Business Case for Monitoring Nonfinancial Risk, 41 J. CORP. L. 647, 653
(2016).
29
See, e.g., BEN CALDECOTT ET AL., LLOYD’S OF LONDON, STRANDED ASSETS: THE TRANSITION TO A LOW CARBON ECONOMY (2017) (reviewing
stranded assets potential impact on insurance industry investment strategies).
30
BEN CALDECOTT ET AL., STRANDED ASSETS: A CLIMATE RISK CHALLENGE 2 (2016).
31
Id. at 3.
32
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §1502, 124 Stat. 1376, 2218 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m (2012)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. Section 1502 required the SEC to implement a rule requiring issuers to investigate and disclosure
whether their products contained conflict minerals from the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
33
Section 1502 was subsequently struck down as a violation of the First Amendment. Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir.
2014). For an examination of the First Amendment issues related to mandatory disclosure, see Celia R. Taylor, The Unsettled State of Compelled
Corporate Disclosure Regulation After the Conflict Mineral Rule Cases, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 427 (2017).
34
Underwriting Environmental, Social and Governance Risks in Non-Life Insurance Business, UNEP FI (Feb. 27, 2019), available at
https://www.unepfi.org/psi/underwriting-esg-risks/.
35
Freya Williams, Meet the nine billion-dollar companies turning a profit from sustainability, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 2, 2016, 11:01 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2016/jan/02/billion-dollar-companies-sustainability-green-giants-tesla-chipotle-ikea-niketoyota-whole-foods (analyzing the success of nine companies that generate a billion dollars or more in annual revenue from products or services
that have sustainability or social good at their core); Jeff Gelski, Sustainable Product Market Could Hit $150 billion in U.S. by 2021,
FOODBUSINESSNEWS (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/13133-sustainable-product-market-could-hit-150-billion-in-usby-2021 (plotting the trajectory of sustainable product sales from 2014 to projected 2021 sales).
36
Fair Trade is a global movement that aims to create sustainable development for disadvantaged producers. Peter Leigh Taylor, In the Market But
Not of It: Fair Trade Coffee and Forest Stewardship Council Certification as Market-Based Social Change, WORLD DEVELOPMENT, Vol. 33, No.
1, pp. 129-147, 132 (2005). Fair Trade issues include environmental stewardship in production, income sustainability for all those in the supply
chain, and community well-being. Why Fair Trade, FAIR TRADE CERTIFIED, https://www.fairtradecertified.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). Fair
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provide the opportunity to meet market demand for sustainable products. 37 The potential value of ESG opportunities
is recognized by the emergence of “green finance.” 38 Companies and financial institutions have created a variety of
green finance mechanisms, to specifically channel capital to environmentally sound projects. 39
Investor interest in the impact ESG factors have on financial value signals a change in the investing climate.
Mainstream investors increasingly seek sustainability information from firms as part of investment decision-making. 40
However, current sustainability disclosure models do not meet investors’ needs for robust information that is
comparable across companies. 41 Moreover, the SEC’s failure to incorporate sustainability factors into its interpretation
of materiality leaves investor needs in the hands of a multiplicity of non-standardized voluntary reporting frameworks,
none of which draw the necessary connection between ESG materiality and financial materiality. 42 The compliance
aspect of materiality is out of step with the market aspect of materiality and this divergence threatens the fundamental
premise of U.S. securities regulation – investor protection. To understand the gap between compliance materiality and
market materiality requires reviewing the evolution of the materiality concept.
B. The Origin of Materiality
The impetus to impose federal regulation on securities markets originated with the stock market collapse of 1929 and
the resulting desire to protect investors from the abuses that lead to the crash. The prevailing political current premised
regulation on market principles: markets need informed investors to function efficiently and investors need
information on listing companies to protect their investments. 43 The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities

Trade produce certification regimes have been established for such products as coffee, chocolate, and athletic and casual apparel. Fair Trade
Certified Products, FAIR TRADE CERTIFIED, https://www.fairtradecertified.org/products (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
37
In his study of forest certification schemes, Professor Cashore coined the term “non-state market-driven” mechanisms to refer to sustainabilityrelated product certification programs that did not rely on “state-centered sovereign authority but rather from companies along the market’s supply
chain.” BENJAMIN CASHORE ET AL., GOVERNING THROUGH MARKETS: FOREST CERTIFICATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF NON-STATE AUTHORITY
4 (2004).
38
“Green finance” refers to the incorporation of environmental factors into decisions made by financial institutions, including reducing
environmental impacts of its financing decisions, proactively financing green companies and technologies, and developing new green financial
products. Yunwen Bai, Michael Faure, and Jing Liu, The Role of China’s Banking Sector in Providing Green Finance, 24 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y F. 89, 95-96 (2013).
39
See Stephen Kim Park, Investors as Regulators: Green Bonds and the Governance Challenges of the Sustainable Finance Revolution, 54 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 1, 8-11 (2018) for an overview discussion of various green finance instruments. For examples of commercial banks’ green financing
initiatives, see IN2, the Wells Fargo Innovation Incubator, founded Wells Fargo. Advancing Technologies for Smart and Connected Communities,
IN2, https://in2ecosystem.com/ (last visited Apr. 9, 2019). IN2 is a technology incubator and platform funded by the Wells Fargo Foundation and
co-administered by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL), to provide commercialization opportunities for early-stage clean energy
and agriculture technologies. Id. Bank of America has issued a series of green bonds over the past several years, the proceeds of which are earmarked
for renewable energy development. Bank of America Has Issued Four Corporate Green Bonds, Raising a Total of $4.35 Billion for Renewable
Energy Projects, BANK OF AMERICA, https://about.bankofamerica.com/en-us/green-bond-overview.html#fbid=HcK87ko35WX (last visited Apr.
9, 2019); Matthew Heimer, How a Big Bank Fueled the Green Energy Boom, FORBES (Aug. 20, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/08/20/bank-ofamerica-wind-solar-energy/.
40
See, e.g., Fink, supra note 23; ESG Investing, STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS, https://www.ssga.com/our-insights/viewpoints/esginvesting.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (noting that investing responsibly entails “full integration of material ESG factors into [] investment
processes,” requiring “quality data”).
41
See infra notes 92–94, and accompanying text.
42
See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
43
Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 418, 422–
424 (2003).
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Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities Acts or Acts) were intended to build efficient capital markets and protect investors
by requiring listing companies to publicly disclose information on their financial condition. 44 More broadly, they
introduced an expectation of transparency for companies listing on stock exchanges. 45
Focusing on the need for information surfaced the obvious question of specifically what information firms would be
required to disclose. Investors did not need, and could not effectively use, all possible information on a company. 46
Regulators, thus, looked for a way to separate information that needed to be disclosed to investors from information
that did not. The Securities Acts created two types of disclosure obligations for companies. 47 In addition to specific
line item disclosures, the Acts also created a more general obligation for companies to disclose information that was
material to understanding the overall financial position of the company. 48 The requirement to disclose material
information continues to the present, most noticeably in Item 303 of the required 10-K annual report, Management’s
Discussion and Analysis. 49
The concept of materiality developed as the threshold for information that the mandatory reporting system would
require firms to disclose. 50 Thus, the definition of materiality for securities law constitutes the primary framing
mechanism for financial reporting. Although the Securities Acts used the term “material,” the original laws did not
define this term, leaving its definition to the judiciary. 51
The U.S. Supreme Court has considered the definition of materiality in a variety of securities contexts. 52 However,
the key case setting out the current accepted definition of materiality concerned claims that material facts had been
omitted from a proxy statement. In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., the Court took on the task of clarifying the
definition of materiality for purposes of Rule 14(a) actions. 53 A fact is material, the Court said, if there were a

44
Williams, supra note 8, at 1240. Focusing attention on the lack of disclosure sent the message of belief in the power of information to affect
behavior, in this case to promote informed investment decisions. Alison B. Miller, Navigating the Disclosure Dilemma: Corporate Illegality and
the Federal Securities Laws, 102 GEO. L. J. 1647, 1652 (2014). Debate over the merits of mandatory versus voluntary corporate disclosure continued
even once the securities acts were in place. One school of thought advanced arguments against mandatory disclosure, claiming that market forces
would lead corporations to disclose whatever information investors truly wanted. See, e.g., George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities
Markets, 37 J. BUS. 117, 120-121, 124 (1964) (arguing that evidence did not support the need for mandatory disclosure). Others argued that market
failures would inevitably result in information asymmetries between company and investors. John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 725-727(1984)(arguing that the nature of information as a public good results in it
being under-provided). Most recently, Prof. Horton produced an empirical study to demonstrate that disclosure before the securities acts was
inadequate, necessitating a mandatory system. See Brent J. Horton, In Defense of a Federally Mandated Disclosure System: Observing PreSecurities Act Prospectuses, 54 AM. BUS. L. J. 743 (2017). For criticism of mandated disclosure generally as a regulatory tool, see, e.g., Omri BenShahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PENN. L. REV. 647, 665-679, 734-742 (2011) (concluding that mandated
disclosure often fails as a regulatory tool either because it does not accomplish its purpose or because its costs outweigh its benefits).
45
Richard C. Sauer, The Erosion of the Materiality Standard in the Enforcement of the Federal Securities Laws, 62 BUS. LAW. 317 (2007).
46
Miller, supra note 41, at 1653; Sauer, supra note 42, at 355 (identifying issues with too much disclosure). Commentators have also noted the cost
to business of having to disclose more information than investors need. See, e.g., Sauer, supra note 42, at 355.
47
Karmel, supra note 8, at 784-46. The 1933 Act related to initial securities registration statements, while the 1934 Act created the requirements of
annual and periodic reporting by listed companies. For purposes of this Article, the obligations and definitions are the same.
48
Miller, supra note 41, at 1653.
49
See Management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2017). The “MD&A” regulation
requires companies to disclose a host of information related to the company’s fiscal years and interim periods. Most of the disclosure items are
couched in the concept of materiality. For example, companies are required to disclose any “material” commitments for capital expenditures, events
or trends that could increase or decrease the company’s liquidity in a “material” way, and off-balance sheet arrangements that could have an effect
“material” to investors. 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.303(a)(1)–(2), (4).
50
Sauer, supra note 42, at 618 (labeling materiality as the “dividing line” between information that influences investor decisions and all other
information); Yvonne Ching Ling Lee, The Elusive Concept of “Materiality” Under U.S. Federal Securities Laws, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 661,
662 (2004) (identifying materiality as separating “essential” information from irrelevant information).
51
LuAnn Bean & Deborah W. Thomas, The Development of the Judicial Definition of Materiality, 17(2) THE ACCT. HISTORIANS J., 113, 115 (Dec.
1990); Kurt S. Schulzke & Gerlinde Berger-Walliser, Toward a Unified Theory of Materiality in Securities Law, 56 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 6,
15 (2017). Rule 405 accompanying Regulation S-K now provides a definition of material information as “those matters to which there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security registered.” 17 C.F.R. §
230.405 (1982).
52
See Bean & Thomas, supra note 48, at 115–16.
53
426 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1976).
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“substantial likelihood” that disclosure of the fact would be viewed by the “reasonable investor” as having altered the
“total mix” of information made available. 54 In 1988, the Supreme Court extended this definition of materiality to
Rule 10(b) actions 55 and it has become the backdrop for all discussions of the concept of materiality. 56
While the Supreme Court was grappling with the contours of materiality, so too was the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). The 1934 Act made the SEC the official standard-setting body for financial accounting and
reporting. 57 As part of the agency’s rule-making authority, it delegated the creation of accounting standards to the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). 58 Materiality for FASB was connected to the information needs of
financial decision makers, specifically, investors. 59 More recently, FASB proposed revisions to its definition of
materiality that would align it with the Supreme Court’s TSC definition. 60 SEC staff accountants have also cited the
TSC definition in agency documents. 61
Academic investigation of financial materiality reflects the diverse aspects of this important concept. One of the most
obvious applications of the term is with regard to securities fraud cases brought under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 62
These cases demonstrate the challenges inherent in the broad statutory and judicial definition of materiality and a large
body of academic literature explores what exactly courts have interpreted the term to mean. Commentary on this issue
emphasizes lack of a precise definition of materiality and the resulting confusion in lower court decisions. 63
Scholars have criticized the TSC definition of materiality, and its implementation, along a host of parameters.
Generally, the definition is characterized as “murky” 64 and “elusive,” 65 leading to difficulties for reporting companies
in determining what is material and, therefore, required to be disclosed. 66 Some scholars bemoan the tendency to overreporting and information overload, fostered by the uncertainty around what is material. 67 Others criticize the
54

Id. at 449.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 249 (1988).
56
Basing disclosure on the materiality concept leaves corporations with considerable flexibility to determine what to disclose. Nina Hart, Note,
Moving at a Glacial Pace: What Can State Attorneys General Do About SEC Inattention to Nondisclosure of Financially Material Risks Arising
from Climate Change?, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 99, 102-03 (2015). However, the inherent ambiguity of the Supreme Court definition has been
criticized as leading to extensive litigation to resolve disagreements regarding the definition and how it impacts disclosure obligations. See, e.g.,
David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Muddling Through Counterfactual Materiality and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessary Search for a Duty to
Disclose Material Non-Financial Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 140 (2007).
57
Jean Rogers & Robert Herz, Corporate Disclosure of Material Information: The Evolution – and the Need to Evolve Again, 25 J. APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 50, 50-51 (2013).
58
FASB originated as an outcome of a study conducted by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) into the state of
accounting standard setting. See Stephen A. Zeff, The Wheat Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles (1971-72): A Historical Study, 34 J.
ACCT. PUB. POL’Y 146, 146 (2015). The Wheat Study on Establishment of Accounting Principles (Wheat Study) revealed deficiencies in the
accounting standard-setting regime, most notably that standard-setting for the accounting profession was dominated by the major accounting firms.
Rogers & Herz, supra note 54, at 51. The Wheat Study recommended establishing a separate, independent body for creating accounting standards.
FASB was created in 1973. Zeff, supra, at 163.
59
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, FASB
CON2-3 (1980)
https://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=1218220132599&acceptedDisclaimer=true. The document’s discussion of
materiality stated that materiality was defined in terms of “what makes a different to a decision maker” and that a decision not to disclose information
may be made because “investors have no need” for the information.
60
Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., Proposed Amendments to Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, Chapter 3: Qualitative Characteristics of
Useful Financial Information, FASB 3 (2015) https://asc.fasb.org/imageRoot/23/73531923.pdf.
61
See, e.g., SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SEC STAFF ACCOUNTING BULLETIN: NO. 99 – MATERIALITY (1999) (quoting TSC definition of materiality).
62
Section 10(b) is the 1934 Act’s primary anti-fraud provision and prohibits the use of “any manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. §78j.
63
See, e.g., Thomas M. Madden, Significance and the Materiality Tautology, 10 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 217, 217 (2015) (describing the “fundamental
void” in defining materiality left by the Supreme Court decision in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano); Richard A. Booth, The Two Faces of
Materiality, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 517, 518-19 (2013) (noting the Supreme Court’s apparently conflicting approaches to materiality in the context of
a class action suit brought under the fraud on the market theory); Matthew Ady, Living in a Material World: Does a Violation of Item 303 or
Regulation S-K Satisfy the Materiality Element in a Rule 10B-5 Cause of Action?, 17 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 401 (2017)
(surveying the apparent split in federal circuit courts on the definition of materiality for purposes of Item 303); and Matthew C. Turk & Karen E.
Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty to Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 978, 986–994 (2018)
(reviewing what it terms the “illusory” circuit split over whether Item 303 disclosures create a duty that is actionable under federal securities law).
Commentators have also noted the confusion among courts of appeal over the distinction between the duty to disclose information and the concept
of materiality. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 164345 (2004); Ady, supra, at 407–411; Turk & Woody, supra.
64
Schulzke & Walliser-Berger, supra note 48, at 8.
65
Lee, supra note 47, at 663–668.
66
Lee notes that this difficulty often results in a standard that is determinable only ex post facto in a shareholder suit or SEC enforcement action.
Id. at 664.
67
Paredes, supra note 40, at 417; Schulzke & Walliser-Berger, supra note 48, at 10.
55
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reductionist potential of the vague definition, leading to nondisclosure of critical information. 68 More recently, a
school of criticism has developed that explores the limits of the concept of the “reasonable investor,” a core component
of materiality. 69
A second stream of materiality scholarship focuses on what is termed “qualitative materiality.” 70 The first iteration of
this concept grew out of the SEC’s dissatisfaction with the traditional, rather narrow, focus on economic materiality. 71
Qualitative materiality posited that conduct that was not financially significant to the company could still be material
to investors, as it reflected management integrity. 72 Professor Miller, for example, has argued that uncharged criminal
conduct may be material for purposes of corporate disclosure. 73 Other commentators, however, viewed qualitative
materiality’s focus on ethics as moving disclosure away from its original goal of creating a transparent market. 74

68
Georgiev, for example, has argued that large firms can avoid disclosing information because their size raises the materiality threshold. George S.
Georgiev, Too Big to Disclose: Firm Size and Materiality Blindspots in Securities Regulation, 64 UCLA L. REV. 602, 606 (2017). See also
Westbrook, supra note 16, at 15-16 (contending that the current materiality standard permits companies to deny the materiality of information where
costs are not currently quantifiable).
69
See, e.g., Margaret V. Sachs, Materiality and Social Change: The Case for Replacing “the Reasonable Investor” with “the Least Sophisticated
Investor” in Inefficient Markets, 81 TULANE L. REV. 473 (2006) (proposing an alternative materiality standard for unsophisticated investors); David
A. Hoffman, The “Duty” To Be a Rational Shareholder, 90 MINN. L. REV. 537 (2006) (examining the disparity between judicial assumptions of
“rational” investor behavior and actual investor behavior); Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599
(2013) (exploring the use of information in human decision-making).
70
See, e.g., John M. Fedders, Qualitative Materiality: The Birth, Struggles, and Demise of an Unworkable Standard, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 41(1998).
71
Id. at 45-46.
72
Id. at 46. The SEC developed this concept largely in response to the Watergate scandal in the early 1970’s, and allegations of improper campaign
contributions by corporations. Id. at 49–50. In the mid 1970’s, the SEC also began focusing on bribes and other questionable practices by
corporations, and corporate efforts to hide these payments through their accounting practices. Id. at 50–51.
73
Miller, supra note 41, at 1665-1666 (claiming that corporate illegality may be important to investors where it has quantitative impact on the
company).
74
See, e.g., Sauer, supra note 42, at 317–357, 330. By the 1990’s, the SEC confronted a new disclosure issue, in the form of “earnings management,”
that it included in qualitative materiality. Earnings management consisted of a variety of accounting practices whereby companies took advantage
of the imprecise definition of materiality to improve the appearance – but not the substance – of their financial results. For example, companies had
begun to set financial thresholds for the materiality of key metrics, for purposes of disclosure. James J. Park, Assessing the Materiality of Financial
Misstatements, 34 J. CORP. L. 513, 516–17 (2009). In addressing the earnings management issue, the SEC utilized the materiality concept, noting
that information is material if investors view it as altering the “total mix” of information, including both quantitative and qualitative factors. SEC,
Staff Accounting Bulletin 99, supra note 58. Under the “qualitative” materiality standard, then, even small financial misstatements could be
“material” if they met certain qualitative criteria. Park, supra, at 516–17. See SEC SAB 99, supra, for examples of relevant qualitative factors.
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Despite the different formulations developed to define materiality, the overall meaning of the legal disclosure regime
was clearly focused on the information needs of investors, in keeping with the investor-protection purpose of the 1933
and 1934 Acts. 75 Further, the SEC has consistently interpreted materiality to mean economic materiality. 76 Thus, the
range of information that is presumed will protect investors is narrowly confined.
C. Materiality and Stakeholders
For nearly 50 years, the meaning of materiality for corporate disclosure purposes was largely unquestioned. But in the
1990’s, dissatisfaction with corporate reporting’s focus on exclusively financial information led new actors with
interests in environmental and/or social issues to advocate for expanded corporate disclosure. This section assesses
the development of materiality through the lens of the organizations that have created the most widely used
sustainability reporting frameworks: the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the CDP, and the International Integrated
Reporting Council (IIRC). 77
Founded in 1997, the GRI administers the oldest and most widely used voluntary sustainability reporting framework
globally. 78 GRI’s overarching disclosure principle is that companies report “material” environmental, social and
governance information. 79 CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project) was organized in 2000 by a coalition of
non-profit organizations and institutional investors. 80 CDP focuses exclusively on voluntary disclosure of
environmental impacts associated with climate change, forests, and water use. Companies report to CDP through its

75

See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
See Karmel, supra note 8, at 786; Williams, supra note 8, at 1264. Prior to 1971, there was no SEC requirement to disclose non-financial
information. David A. York, SEC as Environmentalist: The Reluctant Champion, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 985, 991 (1978). Despite the absence
of a generalized environmental or social disclosure requirement, businesses may have certain specific obligations to disclose environmental or
social information to regulators. For example, Regulation S-K can create the obligation to report information to the SEC under several items. Item
101 contains the most straightforward reporting requirement. Item 101 requires that a reporting company describe its business, including its principal
products and services, sources of raw materials, and its competitive condition. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101 (2006). This Item also requires disclosure with
regard to the effect that compliance with environmental laws and regulations may have on the company’s capital expenditures, earnings and
competitive position. 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii) (2006). A companion item, Item 103, requires companies to describe any “material pending
legal proceedings, other than ordinary routine litigation….” 17 C.F.R. § 229.103 (2006). Instructions for the Item specifically exclude environmental
proceedings from the category of “ordinary routine litigation.” Id. at Instruction 5. Therefore, where environmental-related litigation meets any of
the stated thresholds, the company must disclose it. Perry E. Wallace, Climate Change, Fiduciary Duty, and Corporate Disclosure: Are Things
Heating Up in the Boardroom? 26 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 293, 304 (2008). Last, Item 303 Management’s Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) can be
interpreted to require reporting of environmental and/or social information. The goal of the MD&A is to give investors a look at the company
through the eyes of management, with emphasis on the company’s prospects for the future. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, MANAGEMENT’S DISCUSSION
AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 6835, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE NO.
26,831, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT RELEASE NO. 16,961, 54 FED. REG. 22,227, 22,436 (1989) [hereinafter MD&A RELEASE]; Wallace, supra, at
306; Megan R. Dimitt, Electric Utilities & Climate Risk Disclosure in SEC Filings: Clearing the Air, 35 IOWA J. CORP. L. 449, 454 (2009). The
reporting company must identify trends, demands, commitments, and uncertainties that will have economic or financial impact on it and disclose
those items unless it determines that the event is not reasonably likely to occur. MD&A RELEASE, supra, at 22,430; Wallace, supra, at 307. Scholars
have argued that the MD&A requires disclosure of impacts due to climate change. See, e.g., Wallace, supra, at 309–310. Businesses may also have
to disclose environmental and/or social information to regulators outside of the financial reporting system. Some substantive environmental laws
carry with them an obligation to disclose information to the regulatory agency. Examples include the Toxic Release Inventory, a U.S. federal law
that requires disclosure to the Environmental Protection Agency of the release amounts of each of a list of chemicals. Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et seq. (1986). Similarly, federal employment discrimination laws require
many employers covered by the laws to report annually to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (1991)
(requiring employers subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to file an EEO-1 report). Finally, states may also impose their own
disclosure requirements on companies. In 2012, the California Transparency in Supply Chains Act went into effect, requiring certain large
companies to disclose to the public the extent of their efforts, if any, to ensure that workers who are enslaved, coerced, or otherwise forced into
service or who have been the victims of human trafficking do not produce the goods they sell. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1714.43 et seq. (West 2012);
KAMALA D. HARRIS, CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE CALIFORNIA TRANSPARENCY IN SUPPLY CHAINS ACT: A RESOURCE GUIDE 3 (2015).
Enforcement of the Act is by the California Attorney General. Id.
77
These are organization names, but the acronyms are also commonly used to refer to the reporting mechanisms created by the organizations.
78
Since its creation, more than 12,000 organizations have prepared reports using the GRI framework; more than 30,000 reports have been created
in accordance with GRI frameworks. See Sustainability Disclosure Database, GLOB. REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://database.globalreporting.org/
(last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
79
For a discussion of GRI’s definition of materiality, see infra text accompanying notes 79-80, 173.
80
Ans Kolk, David Levy & Jonatan Pinkse, Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The Institutionalization and Commensuration
of Carbon Disclosure, 17(4) EUROPEAN ACCT. REV. 719, 724 (2008). CDP has over 525 investor signatories, representing $96 trillion in assets.
About Us, CDP, https://www.cdp.net/en/info/about-us (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). See also, CDP, Understanding climate risks and maximizing
financial
rewards:
The
benefits
to
signatories
and
members
3,
available
at
https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/comfy/cms/files/files/000/000/788/original/2017_investor_brochure_pages_web_v2.p
df.
76
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disclosure questionnaires, pre-determined sets of disclosure items related to either climate change or water use. 81 In
2011, the IIRC introduced the concept of “integrated reporting,” 82 an attempt to combine financial and non-financial
reporting. 83 The IIRC framework is a broad set of guidelines, with no suggested disclosure items or questionnaire.
Reporting companies have discretion to decide what to report consistent with the IIRC materiality definition. 84
The approach to materiality plays out differently between GRI and the IIRC, on one hand, and CDP on the other. Both
GRI and the IIRC eschewed the specific line item disclosures that are a part of mandatory financial reporting. Instead,
each framework leaves reporting companies with broad discretion to determine the boundaries of the report. To guide
the use of this discretion, they frame disclosure around the concept of materiality, charging reporting companies to
disclose material information related to ESG issues. 85 In keeping with its stakeholder focus, GRI defines materiality
as information on topics that “reflect the reporting organization’s significant economic, environmental, and social
impacts; or substantively influence the assessments and decisions of stakeholders.” 86
The IIRC utilizes an apparently more focused, but also apparently inconsistent, materiality approach. The IIRC
framework defines material information as that which relates to the business’s ability to create value in the short,
medium, and long term. 87 This appears to reflect the IIRC’s position that the purpose of integrated reporting is to
provide information to providers of financial capital. 88 At the same time, however, the reporting framework contains
a requirement that reporting companies discuss the organization’s relationships with its key stakeholders. 89
Stakeholder interests are implicitly a part of the materiality determination process, insofar as stakeholders provide
insight on issues that can affect the firm’s short, medium, or long term value creation. 90 Thus, the IIRC process seems
to ask companies to consider interests beyond those of investors in deciding what to report, but does not give guidance
as to how to accomplish this balancing. In any event, both GRI and the IIRC approach to materiality leaves important
decisions about report content in the hands of reporting companies.
The CDP process differs markedly from that of GRI or the IIRC, in that reporting to CDP is through a questionnaire.
This approach is more akin to the line item portion of financial reporting, where an authority has predetermined the
items to be disclosed and companies have little discretion to construct the content boundaries of their reporting. 91 The
assumption is that all items on the questionnaire are material for all companies and, therefore, are required disclosure
under the framework. Despite the fragmented nature of the definition of materiality that the GRI, IIRC, and CDP
frameworks evidence, these key organizations had one critical factor in common. All three materiality approaches
conceptualize ESG reporting as separate and distinct from financial reporting.
While non-profit organizations built reporting frameworks around new definitions of materiality, scholars attempted
to connect ESG issues to the traditional notion of materiality. In a seminal article, Professor Williams argued that the
SEC’s legislative mandates gave the agency the authority to require expanded environmental and social disclosure
81
A basic climate change questionnaire (without supply chain-related questions) for CDP consists of approximately 100 pages of questions. For
an example of a climate change questionnaire, see Questionnaires, CDP,
https://guidance.cdp.net/en/guidance?cid=2&ctype=theme&idtype=ThemeID&incchild=1&microsite=0&otype=Questionnaire&tags=TAG646%2CTAG-605%2CTAG-599 (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
82
Accounting for Sustainability, Our Impact/Timeline/2011, https://www.accountingforsustainability.org/en/impact/timeline.html#item-2011
(noting launch of a Discussion Paper on the proposed framework in September 2011).
83
See The IIRC, INTEGRATED REPORTING, http://integratedreporting.org/the-iirc-2/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019). The IIRC defines an integrated report
as communication about how an organization’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead
to the creation of value in the short, medium and long term. INTEGRATED REPORTING, http://integratedreporting.org/ (LAST VISITED Apr. 7, 2019);
The International <IR> Framework, INTEGRATED REPORTING ¶ 1.1 (2013), http://integratedreporting.org/resource/international-ir-framework/
[hereinafter IIRC Framework].
84
Id. at ¶ 1.3–1.6.
85
See
Consolidated
Set
of
GRI
Sustainability
Reporting
Standards
2016,
3,
7,
Glob.
Reporting
Initiative,
https://www.globalreporting.org/standards/gri-standards-download-center/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019) [hereinafter GRI Reporting Standards]; IIRC
Framework, supra note 77, at ¶ 3.17–3.18.
86
GRI Reporting Standards, supra note 79, at 10.
87
IIRC Framework, supra note 77, at ¶ 3.17.
88Id. at ¶ 1.7 (stating that the purpose of an integrated report
is to explain to “providers of financial capital how an organization creates value over time.”).
89Id. at ¶3.10.
90
The framework outlines materiality determination as identifying, evaluating, and prioritizing matters that affect the firm’s value creation. Id. at
¶3.18. The framework also specifically recognizes that stakeholders provide insights on economic, social, and environmental issues that affect the
organization’s ability to create value. Id. at ¶3.12.
91
Although responding to CDP is technically voluntary and companies could choose to not respond to certain questionnaire items, CDP scores and
rates reporting companies in a way that penalizes non-responsiveness. See Climate change scoring methodology, CDP,
https://www.cdp.net/en/scores-2017/climate-change-scoring-methodology (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
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and articulated reasons why the reasonable investor would want this additional information. 92 Other authors further
developed Williams’ position by advancing empirical arguments that reasonable investors were, in fact, demanding
ESG information. 93 A second line of inquiry focused on the use of mandated disclosure to achieve social aims. 94 A
recent example is the conflict mineral disclosure rules that were part of the Dodd-Frank Act. 95 A related research
stream draws connections between corporate disclosure and corporate governance. 96 Recent work in this vein sees
federal disclosure requirements enacted since the 2008 financial crisis as focusing more on shareholder power to
influence corporate conduct, and less on the creation of efficient capital markets. 97 Other scholars characterize ESG
disclosure as a risk management practice. 98
The contribution of GRI, CDP, and the IIRC materiality concepts to increasing the amount of raw information
available is undeniable. However, information users remain unhappy with the state of corporate disclosure. 99 The
broad scope of GRI’s materiality definition presents challenges as it tries to be all things to all stakeholders. While
CDP and IIRC ostensibly incorporate investor concerns through their definitions of materiality, CDP reporters disclose
information on limited factors and the IIRC approach results in broad and inconsistent disclosure. 100 Thus, the
materiality definitions developed for these ESG reporting frameworks produce information that is either incomplete
or not comparable across companies. 101
D. New Materiality for Investors
Continued separation of financial and ESG reporting particularly limited the value of sustainability information for
investors. 102 The disconnect between financial and sustainability information created a persistent sense that companies
did not really understand how sustainability factors impacted core operations, nor did the existing reporting financial
and sustainability reporting frameworks require them to do so. The most recent developments in corporate reporting
reflect attempts to remedy the shortcomings of the existing disconnect between financial and ESG reporting by
reframing the TSC materiality definition.

92

Williams, supra note 8, at 1276–1290 (identifying compliance with the law, environmental and social practices that exceed the law, and
management integrity as factors with economic relevance that should be the subjects of expanded disclosure).
93
See, e.g., Mitchell F. Crusto, Endangered Green Reports: “Cumulative Materiality” in Corporate Environmental Disclosure After SarbanesOxley, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 493–497 (2005) (identifying institutional investors and the insurance industry as key constituents pushing for
expanded corporate environmental disclosure); Monsma & Olson, supra note 53, at 176–180 (arguing that social and environmental information is
“tangibly related to the economic reality of a firm” and, therefore, desired by investors).
94
An early article examined the materiality of companies’ business relationships with countries and governments that are subject to U.S. economic
sanctions. Note, Should the SEC Expand Nonfinancial Disclosure Requirements?, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1433 (2002).
95
See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Professor Choudhury contends that social disclosure rules like the conflict mineral rules can advance
social aims by forcing corporations to acknowledge social issues within the business environment. Barnali Choudhury, Social Disclosure, 13
BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 183, 216 (2016).
96
See, e.g., Faith Stevelman, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary law’s Relevance to Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV.
Rev. 505 (1999-2000) (articulating the connection between corporate fiduciary law and corporate disclosure to shareholders); Roberta S. Karmel,
Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas – The Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 79 (2005) (arguing that the disclosure provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act constitute the federalization of corporate governance).
97
Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 91,104-106 (2017).
98
Virginia Harper Ho, Nonfinancial Risk Disclosure and the Costs of Private Ordering, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 407, 411-13 (2018) (arguing that the
current model of nonfinancial risk disclosure is ineffective); David Monsma & John Buckley, Non-Financial Corporate Performance: The Material
Edges of Social and Environmental Disclosure, 11 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 151, 161, 176-181 (2003–2004)(exploring the responsibility of firms for
their non-financial disclosures and the risk of poor environmental and social performance on firm reputation and value).
99
See, e.g., Jeff Leinaweaver, Is Corporate Sustainability Reporting a Great Waste of Time?, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2015),
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jan/06/corporate-sustainability-reporting-waste-time; Robert Eccles et al., The Need for
Sector-Specific Materiality and Sustainability Reporting Standards, 24(2) J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., 65, 65, 71 (2012); Neil Parmar, Messy with
Metrics, CORP. KNIGHTS 41, 41-42 (Winter 2015)..
100
See Mary Shapiro, Investors Want More From Sustainability Reporting, Says Former SEC Head, CFO J. (Nov. 12, 2015, 9:32 AM),
https://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/11/12/investors-want-more-from-sustainability-reporting-says-former-sec-head/; Leinaweaver, supra note 92.
101
See Marianne Bradford et al., Sustainability Reports: What Do Stakeholders Really Want?,16 MGMT. ACCT. Q. 13, 13-14 (2014).
102
A variety of studies surfaced shortcomings in existing reporting from the perspective of investors. A 2014 study conducted by PwC on investor
attitudes on sustainability reporting found that most investors were dissatisfied with current reporting, especially insofar as it generally did not
connect
sustainability
to
business
strategy.
Sustainability
Goes
Mainstream,
PWC,
7–8
(May
2014),
http://www.truevaluemetrics.org/DBpdfs/Sustainability/PwC/pwc-sustainability-goes-mainstream-investor-views.pdf. In a follow-up survey, PwC
discovered that only 29% of investors expressed confidence in the quality of the sustainability information they received from companies. Investors,
Corporates, and ESG: Bridging the Gap, PWC, 7 (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/investors-corporates-bridginggap/. An EY investor survey echoed these complaints. A significant portion of investors responding to the survey stated that the inconsistency and
lack of comparability of sustainability information kept them from considering sustainability issues in their investment decisions. Is your nonfinancial performance revealing the true value of your business to investors?, EY, 23–24 (2017), http://integratedreporting.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/EY_Is_your_nonfinancial_performance_revealing.pdf.
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In 2007, a coalition of parties petitioned the SEC for interpretive guidance that would clarify the connection between
climate change risk and materiality. 103 Petitioners claimed that “companies must consider climate risk in their review
of information that may be material and subject to disclosure.” 104 The 2007 Petition specifically incorporated the TSC
definition of materiality, arguing that investor demand for climate-related information demonstrated that reasonable
investors considered climate risk as part of the mix of information important in their decisions. 105 The 2007 Petition
was hotly contested and highly politicized. 106 Nevertheless, in 2010, the SEC issued interpretive guidance, identifying
climate change risk as potentially material information, as defined in TSC. 107
Despite the apparent success of the 2007 Petition, its focus on a single ESG issue – climate – limited its impact. The
Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) launched a more holistic and concerted attempt to leverage
existing financial reporting mechanisms to advance the state of corporate reporting and move sustainability into the
mainstream. 108
Formed in 2011, SASB functions as an independent standard-setting organization for sustainability accounting
standards. 109 SASB’s mission is to create sustainability accounting standards for public corporations to disclose
material information to investors in SEC filings, including the Form 10-K annual report. 110 SASB’s dissatisfaction
with the then-existing framing of the information asymmetry problem led to a vision and mission that emphasized
investors as the leverage point to drive improved ESG performance. 111 SASB fully embraced the potential of TSC
materiality to change corporate behavior in a way that improved sustainability outcomes. 112 Thus, its objective was
to capture all factors associated with a firm’s value creation by extending reporting to include material sustainability

103

CERES et al., Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure 2, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 18, 2007),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2007/petn4-547.pdf [hereinafter 2007 Petition]; Letter from Mindy Lubber, President, Ceres, to Mary Jo White,
Chair, SEC (July 21, 2016) (available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-214.pdf). Supplemental petitions were filed in 2008 and
2009 by the same signatories of the 2007 Petition. Each re-affirmed the petitioners request for clearer guidance from the SEC on climate risk
disclosure requirements. CERES et al., Request for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 12, 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-547-2008.pdf; CERES et al., Supplemental Petition for Interpretive Guidance on Climate Risk
Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 23, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2009/petn4-547-2009.pdf. The Petitioners included
investors and environmental groups. Institutional investors signing the petition included the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) and state officials responsible for public pension funds in California, New York, Florida, North Carolina and several other states. 2007
Petition, supra, at A-1 to A-3; 57–58. Environmental groups included Ceres, Environmental Defense, and Friends of the Earth. Id. at 57–58. The
petitioners based their petition on claims of poor climate-related disclosure by corporations, arguing that the absence of government-mandated
climate risk disclosure led to the use of voluntary disclosure mechanisms, yielding inadequate information. Id., at 39.
104
2007 Petition, supra note 96, at 9 (emphasis added).
105
Id. at 14.
106
Joel Kirkland, SEC Issues Climate-Risk Guidance Despite Tough Political Environment, NY TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/01/28/28climatewire-sec-issues-climate-risk-guidance-despite-tou-27171.html.
Opponents objected to the 2007 Petition for a variety of reasons, including the uncertainty of climate science and the cost of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions. Id.
107
Id. The Guidance went into effect on February 8, 2010. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Climate Guidance Regarding Disclosures Related to Climate
Change, 17 CFR PARTS 211, 231 and 241, https://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
108
SASB’s Conceptual Framework identified five “sustainability dimensions:” the environment, social capital, human capital, business model and
innovation, and leadership and governance. SASB CF 2017, supra note 101, at 2-3. SASB standards are based on the TSC definition of materiality.
SASB’s Approach to Materiality for the Purpose of Standards Development 4, Staff Bulletin No. SB002-07082017, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT.
STANDARDS
B D.
(2017),
http://library.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/ApproachMateriality-Staff-Bulletin01192017.pdf?hsCtaTracking=9280788c-d775-4b34-8bc8-5447a06a6d38%7C2e22652a-5486-4854-b68f-73fea01a2414 [hereinafter SASB Staff
Bulletin].
109
SASB Rules of Procedure, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 4 (Feb. 2017), https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SASBRules-of-Procedure.pdf [hereinafter SASB Rules]; SASB Conceptual Framework, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., 1 (Feb. 2017),
https://www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SASB-Conceptual-Framework.pdf [hereinafter SASB CF 2017]. SASB is a U.S. 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization. Diane K. Schooley & Denise M. English, SASB: A Pathway to Sustainability Reporting in the U.S., CPA J., Apr. 2015, at 22,
24
110
SASB CF 2017, supra note 101, at 1; SASB Rules, supra note 101, at 4; Why SASB?, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/why-sasb/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
111
SASB envisions an “investment universe where a shared understanding of companies’ sustainability performance enables companies and
investors to make informed decisions that drive improved sustainability outcomes.” Mission, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD.,
https://www.sasb.org/governance/ (last visited Apr. 27, 2019). To achieve this vision, SASB sees its mission as “establish[ing] disclosure standards
on sustainability matters that facilitate communication by companies to investors of decision-useful information.” Id. SASB’s Conceptual
Framework defined “sustainability” as “corporate activities that maintain or enhance the ability of the company to create value over the long term.”
SASB CF 2017, supra note 101, at 2, 4–7.
112
Steve Lydenberg et al., From Transparency to Performance iv (2010) [hereinafter IRI Report], https://iri.hks.harvard.edu/links/transparencyperformance-industry-based-sustainability-reporting-key-issues. See also Jaclyn Jaeger, Sustainability Reporting’s Focus Now on Materiality,
COMPLIANCE WEEK 22, 22-23 (Aug. 2014) (noting SASB’s work developing reporting standards that challenge companies to consider how to
incorporate sustainability issues into business strategy).
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topics. 113 SASB’s name and function are modeled on FASB, the organization charged by the SEC with creating
financial accounting standards. 114 SASB sees itself as the sustainability equivalent of FASB, crafting standards to
disclose ESG impacts in SEC filings. 115 SASB’s works to extend accounting infrastructure to incorporate material
sustainability factors, drawing a direct link between ESG factors and financial materiality. 116 More importantly,
SASB’s approach to sustainability disclosure parallels the logic underlying U.S. securities laws by focusing on
sustainability factors that are most likely to be material, as defined under TSC. 117 SASB explicitly utilizes the TSC
materiality definition as the basis for its standard-setting process, which defines operational metrics on ESG topics
likely to be material. 118 To date, SASB has created disclosure standards for 77 industries. 119
E. Leverage for Change: Investor Desire
The SEC’s failure to include ESG factors into the mandatory reporting framework ignores the market signals of the
importance of these issues and hampers progress toward more sustainable business in two interconnected ways.
Relegating sustainability disclosure to voluntary reporting systems discounts the practical value of a mandatory
system. Commentators note the importance of legal requirements – what Professor Williams calls the “power of
legality” - in driving changes in behavior. 120 As long as sustainability disclosure remains separate from required
disclosure, changes in corporate conduct will be few and slow. The leverage point for change lies with investors, and
investors desire improved ESG information. 121 Investor attempts to access ESG information outside the mandatory
disclosure system (such as BlackRock’s annual letter) are an indication of investor interest. Thus, the SEC’s position
ignores the wants of those it is supposed to protect by thwarting ESG integration. 122
Having separate bodies of information for financial and sustainability data makes it difficult to identify how ESG
performance affects the financial value of a company, which stymies the use of ESG factors in investment decisions. 123
Business acts largely as incentivized, either through costs and penalties(such as increased regulation) or through
rewards. Inadequate ESG information means that investors cannot effectively offer the reward of investor dollars to
foster changes in corporate behavior. 124 Corporate changes to improve sustainability performance are slow because
the incentives are uncertain and unclear. However, better information could unleash investment in favor of
sustainability, incentivizing business to bring its practices in line with investor interests, moving sustainability
forward.
SASB’s reporting framework can act as a mechanism to provide investors the information needed to serve ESG
integration. The convergence of financial materiality and ESG materiality speaks to investors’ desire for decisionuseful sustainability information. With SASB’s industry-specific KPIs, investors have a tool to pressure companies to
disclose information in a way that allows for allocation of investment funds to promote sustainability along two
avenues. First, investors can channel money to reward good sustainability performers and incentivize them to continue
their beneficial practices. Investors can also take the approach of KKR and target companies that are ESG laggards,
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SASB CF 2017, supra note 101, at 4-5.
See Industry-Based Sustainability Standards to Guide Corporations and Investors on Material Issues for Disclosure in the Form 10-K,
SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD. 12 (Dec. 7, 2011) [hereinafter SASB Briefing Document].
115
Id. at 15.
116
SASB CR 2017, supra note 101, at 4-5 (explaining that sustainability accounting extends traditional financial accounting by incorporating
material sustainability related issues such as risks associated with mismanagement of ESG issues); SASB Staff Bulletin, supra note 108, at 4 (noting
that SASAB identifies only sustainability factors that have material impacts and warrant standardized disclosure).
117
SASB Staff Bulletin, supra note 116, at 3-4.
118
SASB CF 2017, supra note 69, 5, 9–10; SASB Staff Bulletin, supra note 109, at 4. SASB’s disclosure standards are in the form of industry-specific
key performance indicators (KPIs) on ESG issues that may meet the threshold of TSC materiality. IRI Report, supra note 104, at 10; SASB CF
2017, supra note 101, at 12. The ultimate decision on whether a particular metric meets the definition of materiality for a specific company remains
in the hands of the reporting company. SASB Staff Bulletin, supra note 109, at 1-2.
119
Standards Overview, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD., https://www.sasb.org/standards-overview/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
120
See Cynthia A. Williams, The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational Corporate Accountability, and Global Regulatory Counter-Currents,
1 UC IRVINE J. INT’L, TRANSNAT’L, & COMP. L. 67, 81–82 (2016) (noting that the evidence indicates that disclosure must be mandatory to have
operational effects). But cf., Gerlinde Berger-Walliser & Inara Scott, Redefining Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Globalization and
Regulatory Hardening, 55 AM. BUS. L. J. 167 (2018) (discussing the drawbacks of the legalization of corporate social responsibility).
121
See supra notes 92-95, and accompanying text.
122
ESG integration is defined as incorporating environmental, social and governance factors into business and investment decisions. Eccles &
Kastrapeli, supra note 26, at 5.
123
Id. at 13–15 (noting the lack of specific types of ESG data and the impact on decision making).
124
Id. at 15 (arguing that without data on material issues, it is “impossible” for investors to have the necessary knowledge for their investment
decisions).
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using investment to mitigate their worst practices and start them on a trajectory toward sustainability. 125 Either way,
SASB’s reporting framework lays the groundwork for an infusion of capital to foster improved corporate sustainability
performance.
On its surface, the development of the materiality concept is about the mechanics of corporate disclosure. With
SASB’s adoption of TSC materiality, the term’s meaning appears to have come full circle, with return to focus on
investors’ information needs. This would suggest that the SEC and SASB are natural partners in the field of corporate
reporting. In fact, the SEC’s public denigration of SASB’s work demonstrates its antipathy toward SASB’s goals. The
field of sociology provides a useful framework to interpret the divide between SASB and the SEC, and to better
understand the trajectory of materiality.
II. Understanding the Social Meaning of Materiality
The gap between SASB and the SEC centers on the term materiality and exists at the level of meaning. How can a
word be defined the same way yet carry different meaning? The sociological theory of social constructionism helps
unpack the idea of meaning, and its ramifications for materiality and corporate reporting.
A. Defining Social Meaning
Social constructionism holds that our knowledge of the world is not objective or the result of direct perception of the
world. 126 The true nature of things in the world is a product of social interactions; meaning exists as it is defined in
and by a society. 127 Social constructionism argues that the meaning of phenomena is created through social
interactions. 128 Social interactions can be seen as sensemaking activities, where people make their world logical and
meaningful. 129 Groups negotiate and construct shared understandings of what things in the world mean; these
understandings reflect the group’s norms and its social order. 130
This shared interpretation of phenomena is referred to as social meaning. Social meaning is a product of the processes
of collective definition by a given group. 131 It is the shared agreement on what specific phenomena mean and the
concepts and language used to describe the phenomena. 132 Context heavily influences the creation of social
meaning, 133 with cultural, historical, and socioeconomic factors all affecting social meaning. 134 Thus, different groups
may have different ideas for categorizing phenomena, and for articulating these categorizations. 135 The issue of
homelessness provides an illustrative example. In the 1970’s, Washington, D.C. was among the first cities to recognize
the emerging social problem of homelessness. The main non-profit organization focusing on the issue initially framed
homelessness around the characteristics of many homeless as capable of making rational choices, but unwilling to
cooperate with the rules imposed at government-run shelters. 136 Gradually, their framing evolved to focus on
economic inequality as the cause of homelessness. 137 The eventual social meaning of homelessness centered on
125

See supra note 91 and accompanying text (identifying incorporation of ESG criteria as risk management).
VIVIEN BURR, SOCIAL C ONSTRUCTIONISM 2–3, 6 (2d ed. 2003). Social constructionism has its intellectual roots in work on the sociology of
knowledge, the study of how social forces construct knowledge, a field pioneered by Berger and Luckmann. Joel Best, Constructionist Social
Problems Theory, 36 ANNALS INT’L COMM. ASS’N 237, 239 (2013). Their work is related to ethnomethodology, a discipline that studies how people
construct and make sense of social life. BURR, supra, at 12–13; James A. Holstein & Gale Miller, Social Constructionism and Social Problems
Work, in RECONSIDERING SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONISM 151, 151-153 (James A. Holstein & Gale Miller eds., 1993). Social constructionism
rejects essentialism. See Burr, supra, at 13; cf. Natasha J. Silber, Note, Unscrambling the Egg: Social Constructionism and the Antireification
Principle in Constitutional Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1880 (2013) (noting essentialism is treated with suspicion).
127
Timothy F. Malloy, The Social Construction of Regulation: Lessons from the War Against Command and Control, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 267, 27374 (2010); Best, supra note 118, at 239; JONG S. JUN, THE SOCIAL C ONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 11, 48 (2006); Joseph W.
Schneider, Social Problems Theory: The Constructionist View, 11 ANN. REV. SOC. 209, 210 (1985) (describing a call for a revised conceptualization
of social problems as viewed through a constructivist lens); Stephen Hilgartner & Charles L. Bosk, The Rise and Fall of Social Problems: A Public
Arenas Model, 94 AM. J. SOC. 53 (1988).
128
Best, supra note 118, at 239; Jun, supra note 119, at 11; Malloy, supra note 119, at 273–74; Silber, supra note 118, at 1880.
129
Catrien J.A.M. Termeer, Barriers to New Modes of Horizontal Governance, 11 PUB. MGMT. REV. 299, 301 (2009). Social constructionist scholars
identify meaning making as a key aspect of human life. See, e.g., Silber, supra note 118, at 1880
130
Holstein & Miller, supra note 118, at 153-54.
131
Hilgartner & Bosk, supra note 119, at 53.
132
Holstein & Miller, supra note 118, at 153.
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Cynthia J. Bogard, Claimsmakers and Contexts in Early Constructions of Homelessness: A Comparison of New York City and Washington,
D.C., 24 SYMBOLIC INTERACTION 425, 427–28 (2001); Silber, supra note 80, at 1880.
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Burr, supra note 118, at 3–4.
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Id.; Holstein & Miller, supra note 118, at 154; Miller, supra note 122, at 350.
136
Bogard, supra note 125, at 434-435.
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Id. at 436.
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prevailing economic conditions, rather than the personal characteristics of the homeless population. Proposed policy
solutions centered on meeting the immediate needs of the homeless by providing shelter with dignity. 138 By contrast,
New York City defined homelessness around the personal deficiencies of homeless persons. New York state budget
cuts had resulted in the deinstitutionalization of patients from state psychiatric hospitals and New York City officials
claimed that a significant percentage of the City’s homeless were former psychiatric facility patients. 139 For New York
City officials, many advocacy groups for the homeless, and major media outlets, the homeless problem, was, thus, a
mental health issue. 140 New York state government officials, on the other hand, portrayed the City’s homeless
population as victims of the City’s own housing policies and increasing gentrification. 141
This example illustrates two important and related aspects of social meaning. First, different parties can and do
understand and characterize the same phenomenon differently; they attach different social meaning to the same set of
facts. This occurs because social meaning is based on a specific experience of the situation and a specific idea of what
the situation is about. 142 More importantly, the social meaning of a phenomenon can change, even though the
phenomenon itself has not. 143 Since social meanings are “constructed,” change from one social meaning to another
happens through specific interventions, not mere evolution. 144 Changing social meaning proceeds by breaking up the
understandings currently attached to phenomena and replacing them with new characterizations of those phenomena,
as occurred in Washington D.C. 145 These new characterizations represent alternate social norms, advocated for by
specific groups. 146 At the point where the new characterizations become widely accepted, the phenomena has acquired
a new social meaning. 147
Social constructionist scholarship focuses on the social processes used to change and shape social meaning around
specific conditions (such as financial collapse or homelessness). 148 The activity of making complaints or demands
around existing social meaning is called claimsmaking. 149 Claimsmaking is comprised of intervention activities (such
as writing an opinion article for the newspaper, staging a demonstration or boycott, or submitting a petition to a
legislator) that seek to define social meaning. 150
Spector and Kitsuse propose a natural history model to analyze claimsmaking activities (CMA), which highlights the
interactions between government and non-government actors in the claimsmaking process. 151 The model is based
around stages that can be used to analyze the trajectory of intervention activities, as well as to create strategy for CMA.
At the initial stage, claimsmakers attempt to assert the characterization of some situation as undesirable and to define
the problem through their characterization of the problem. This is where parties identify the concepts and language
used to describe the phenomena that constitute the frame for its social meaning. 152 The frame reflects a particular
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Id. at 432–35.
Id. at 437–38.
140
Id. at 437–38. The New York Times, for example, adhered to the argument that deinstitutionalization of mental health patients was a major cause
of homelessness in the City. Id. at 438 (commenting on the Times’ allegiance to deinstitutionalization as a causal model as evidenced by a 19809
article).
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Id. at 438. Then-mayor Ed Koch had resisted calls to create more homeless shelters, arguing that such shelters had a damaging effect on
neighborhood property values. Id. at 437.
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MALCOLM SPECTOR & JOHN I. KITSUSE, C ONSTRUCTING SOCIAL PROBLEMS 76, 78–79 (Cummings Pub. Co. 1977)
143
For example, the state of New York eventually acknowledged the role that its deinstitutionalization of psychiatric patients played in the increase
of homelessness. Bogard, supra note 125, at 438–39.
144
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 961–62 (1995).
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Id. at 962.
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Social constructionism is often used as a tool of change to challenge the status quo. Silber, supra note 118, at 1880.
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Lessig, supra note 136, at 962.
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Malloy, supra note 119, at 276; Silber, supra note 118, at 1880; SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 134, at 76.
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SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 134, at 75.
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Malloy, supra note 119, at 277; SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 134, at 78–79.
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Hilgartner & Bosk, supra note 119, at 54. Natural history models are used to chart the development of issues over time and through different
stages of a development process. Id.; see also SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 134, at 142.
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Schneider, supra note 119, at 214; Best, supra note 118, at 246–47. The term “frame” is most commonly used in the study of social movement
organizations. It is the equivalent of the concept of rhetoric in claimsmaking. Id. at 246.
139

15

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at American
Business Law Journal, published by Wiley on behalf of The American Business Law Journal and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.
Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1111/ablj.12148

experience of the social condition. 153 Frames often interpret the world in ways that differ from and challenge the
existing characterizations of situations. 154 They can serve a transformative function by recharacterizing phenomena
and, thus, redefining the issue. 155
Frames are also an outcome of the negotiation of shared meaning and the process of creating social meaning. 156
Determining the frame and language used to frame the situation has important pragmatic impacts on CMA because
frames are used to attract adherents to a particular social meaning. Frames exist in what Best has termed a “social
problems marketplace,” where claims compete for attention and institutional response. 157 Attracting supporters to a
claim requires that the claimsmaker’s frame align with the potential adherents’ frame. 158 Framing also indicates the
claimsmaker’s attempt to exert control, or ownership, over the social meaning of the issue. 159 Different claimsmakers,
including government actors, may all be vying for control of framing of the situation; some claims may challenge the
status quo while others may favor maintaining the status quo. 160
If claimsmakers are successful in pressing their claim, government or some other institution with authority over the
situation, may respond to the CMA by recognizing the legitimacy of the claimsmakers. 161 This official response may,
in some circumstances, decrease the claimsmaker’s control over the claim, as an agency with its own frame exerts
control over the problem. 162 The government, for example, both initiates and receives claims 163 and may have
institutionalized a specific meaning around a given situation. 164 Thus, government itself can control, and even change,
the meaning of a situation through framing that is created and controlled by bureaucrats. 165 Further, recognition is no
guarantee that government will actually address the social issue. The authority may recommend no change,
recommend a change that does not satisfy the claimsmakers, or recommend a change that is not subsequently
enacted. 166
Where official action on the claimsmakers’ complaints yields unsatisfactory results, new CMA may surface. Often,
claims at this stage relate to inadequate, ineffective, or unjust government procedures, rather than to the original social
issue. 167 They attempt to push government to address what are perceived to be inadequate or ineffective government
measures around a social problem. At some point, claimsmakers may decide that it is no longer possible to “work
within the system” to achieve satisfactory change. 168 Activities become premised on challenging the legitimacy of the
established authority and its processes for addressing the claims. 169 The claimsmakers’ focus may shift from
complaints about the established procedures to the creation of alternative procedures that function outside the
government framework. 170
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B. The Changing Social Meaning of Materiality
The actual course of CMA and social meaning development is not linear. Social meaning itself is constructed and,
therefore, can be de-constructed and re-constructed differently. 171 The dynamism of this process means that
claimsmaking activities move forward and backward through the phases of Spector and Kitsuse’s model as societal
norms and expectations evolve. The development of materiality can be viewed as a series of interventions where
claimsmakers acted to shape the direction of materiality as reflecting societal expectations.
1. Materiality as Financial Information
Following the 1929 stock market collapse, government attention centered on whether the collapse indicated the need
for regulation of the market. Those who opposed regulation framed the situation as a normal, if unfortunate, market
mechanism that would purge the system and self-correct without regulation. 172 However, the majority of Congress
saw the collapse as an issue of financial misdealing and misdeeds. 173 Their claimsmaking activities framed the
discussion in terms of bad companies and bad bankers who had acted in ways that jeopardized the economy and the
savings of many citizens. They argued that those who created the collapse would not voluntarily change their behavior,
leaving regulation as the only viable option. 174 Some advocates of regulation framed the issue as the need for
government supervision of listed companies, while other framed the issue as an information asymmetry problem. 175
Those who saw the fundamental cause of the market collapse as inadequate information for investors eventually won
the day and created our mandatory disclosure system with its focus on materiality. 176
The social meaning embedded in the political debate over regulation of financial markets reflected changing attitudes
toward the relationship between business and society. Imposition of a regulatory regime carried the message that
financial misdeeds needed regulating, and that society could not rely on bankers to self-regulate or the market to selfcorrect. Creating a legal requirement to disclose information communicates the belief that, absent such a requirement,
companies simply will not reveal information about themselves. Construction of a complex legal apparatus for
corporate reporting also acted as a norm catalyst, creating a nascent expectation of transparency in investors. 177 The
narrow focus of the Securities Acts reflects the claimsmakers’ narrow view of business impacts on society. Policy
advocates argued that business behavior led to the stock market collapse and therefore directly impacted investors; 178
the social meaning of their framing was thus limited to the financial information needed to protect investors and
resurrect the economy.
Although the government had been slow to become involved in the recovery from the stock market collapse, the
accelerated rate of involvement with the change of presidential administrations is an example of the power of
government as claimsmaker. Government has at its disposal several unique tools to utilize in its CMA. For example,
Congress convened public hearings to publicize the misdeeds that led to collapse of the market and rallied the public
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Termeer, supra note 121, at 301.
The incumbent Presidential administration of Herbert Hoover, along with bankers and Wall Street executives, were adherents to this position.
JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 3-12 (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2003). Some Republicans, including President Hoover,
questioned whether the federal government had the authority to regulate the stock exchanges. Id. at 5.
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Congressional feeling was fueled by public hearings held by the Senate Banking and Currency Committee to investigate the causes of the collapse.
Id. at 5. The hearings documented the practices of Wall Street bankers and executives that ostensibly caused the collapse, including unsound
lending and borrowing practices and high executive compensation. Id. at 23-26. For a detailed discussion of the hearings, see id. at 21 – 38.
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Id. at 5.
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Some advocated for a degree of national industrial planning and a greater role for government in judging the financial value of companies. Id. at
41. Proposals included the creation of a national Economic Council to provide “integrated industrial planning.” Id. Calls for reconsideration of
federal merit review of securities offerings resurface in times of economic collapse. In the wake of the 2008 financial collapse, for example, scholars
returned to arguments for merit review. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and the Case for
Federal Merit Review, 44 U. RICH. L REV. 647 (2009–2010).
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This group included new President Franklin Roosevelt. In a message to Congress, Roosevelt wrote that the government “should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are sound….There is, however, an obligation upon us
to insist that every issue of new securities…shall be accompanied by full publicity and information….” Seligman, supra note 164, at 53.
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For a detailed discussion of the connection between norms and law, see Lessig, supra note 136; Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996). See also Larry Cata Backer, Transparency Between Norm, Technique and Property in International Law and
Governance: The Example of Corporate Disclosure Regimes and Environmental Impacts, 22 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2013) (discussing hard and soft
law as embedding norms).
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Professor Williams notes that the chair of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee, Senator Fletcher, defined the cause of the stock market
collapse as people having been persuaded to invest their money in securities without being given any information on the securities. Williams, supra
note
, at 1232-1233. Williams identifies investor protection as “a major goal” of the Securities Acts. Id., at 1234.
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to the need for regulation. 179 President Roosevelt favored regulation of a specific type and had sufficient influence
over Congress to give government control over the definitions and framing of the issue, as well as much of the social
meaning of the situation. 180 The result was the Securities Acts and the now-familiar mandatory disclosure regime with
its focus on material information.
Embedding transparency in legal constructs gave the government the upper hand in setting and controlling the social
meaning of the corporate reporting regime. The exclusive focus on investor protection is understandable, given the
context of the market collapse that catalyzed creation of the disclosure regime. The limited range of information
reflects society’s concerns at the time. But the focus on exclusively financial information also reflects societal
expectations in a broader sense. There was no awareness of or interest in environmental issues among the population
as a whole, nor did we have the global supply chains that exist now, with the attendant social issues.
The 1970’s saw some dissatisfaction with the strictly financial focus of the existing disclosure framework, as
evidenced by the attempts to define qualitative materiality to incorporate ethics issues into mandated disclosure. 181
However, this movement enjoyed only weak support from the SEC, which still favored a purely economic definition
of materiality. Thus, the first frame for materiality – a focus on financial information for investors as epitomized by
the TSC definition of materiality – was largely uncontested.
2. Materiality and Sustainability Information
Toward the end of the 20th century, societal expectations began to change, with increased interest in sustainability
issues such as pollution and workers’ rights. 182 New claimsmakers challenged the status quo of corporate reporting
practices and reframed the idea of materiality. 183 These claimsmakers represented stakeholder groups, other than
investors, who wanted information on corporate operations to better assess business’s impact on the world. 184 They
included environmental groups, human rights organizations, and civil rights groups. 185 For them, defining materiality
in terms of investor needs carried with it the message that business’s responsibilities were to its investors only. These
claimsmakers argued that, since business had impacts beyond its investors, it also had responsibilities beyond its
investors, including responsibilities to disclose non-financial information. 186 They redefined the issue as not merely
fostering efficient markets, but fostering a better world. 187 The existing mandatory reporting scheme, which focused
nearly exclusively on disclosure of financial information, did not meet the information needs of these groups, nor did
it reflect their view of what was material information.
Sustainability claimsmakers framed the problem around expanded responsibilities for business to society. 188 They
viewed the information asymmetry issue to include information users beyond investors and information in addition to
financial information. 189 Their definitions of materiality reflect this broader social meaning. GRI’s materiality
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See Steve Thel, The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42, STAN. L. REV. 385, 434 (1990). As the press reported
details of the bankers’ testimony, the public grew outraged at the apparent greed of the bankers and favored regulation of the securities industry.
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, at 1246-1247 (recounting efforts in the 1970’s to expand social disclosure).
185
Id.
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GRI Reporting Standards, supra note
, GRI 101: Foundation 3.
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Standards, supra note
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definition, with its focus on the information needs of stakeholders, has been influential in expanding the discussion of
materiality. 190 Although the CDP and IIRC materiality definitions lack the breadth of GRI’s, they carry with them the
presumption that the concept of materiality includes ESG information. 191
We might expect that these different framings around ESG disclosure would attract different types of adherents to the
claimsmakers’ initiatives. In fact, this has not been the case. Use by companies undertaking ESG reporting has
increased for all three frameworks. 192 All three organizations partner with a variety of other non-profit organizations,
professional organizations, and intergovernmental organizations. 193 While CDP’s database of reported information is
intended to be used by investors to a greater extent than it appears are GRI or IIRC reports, this difference is not
surprising, given CDP’s structure and framing. 194 The coalescence of adherents around all three organizations may
reflect the nature of ESG reporting at this stage. Each of the organizations’ framings align partially with the frames of
potential adherents, leaving no clear winner in the competition for attention. 195
All three of these organizations have garnered considerable power in the ESG reporting field. However, they do not
appear to try to use this power to control the social meaning of ESG disclosure within the context solely of ESG
reporting. Each has its own concepts defining materiality for reporting purposes, but the field seems constructed to
tolerate differences in problem definition. 196 In a new field where ideas are in the process of development, tolerance
for different definitions may help evolution of the field, as it allows for experimentation with multiple different
possibilities. 197
The social meaning of the ESG reporting movement’s definition of materiality – that business carries responsibility
for economic, environmental and social impacts and must disclose information on all three – reflects increased societal
expectations for business. However, its notion of materiality conceptualizes ESG impacts as separate from financial
impacts, and ESG reporting and separate from financial reporting. Even the CDP’s focus on providing information
for investors did so outside the parameters of financial reporting. Bisecting the information asymmetry problem into
financial and non-financial categories sent two separate but related messages. First, it echoed the prevailing belief that
environmental and social performance had no impact on financial performance. It separated these categories at the
operations level, not merely the information level. Since environmental and social issues were not conneed to core
operations, business could continue to treat them as secondary concerns, isolated at the periphery. Thus, in the minds
of many businesses, ESG reporting and performance improvements were convenient extras to pursue for improved
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reputation, but were also expendable if need be. The voluntary nature of ESG reporting, coupled with the mindset of
sustainability as nice but not necessary, led to inconsistent and subpar ESG disclosure. 198 Companies could and did
use sustainability reports to burnish their reputations, rather than to engage in candid disclosure.
Significantly, none of these organizations positions ESG reporting in the larger context of corporate disclosure
generally. Framing in such a way that ESG reporting and mandatory financial reporting intersect would have reduced
the difference in the social meaning of traditional corporate reporting and sustainability disclosure. It would also have
pushed government to a decision on the legitimacy of GRI, CDP, and the IIRC as sustainability claimsmakers. Instead
of attempting any degree of frame alignment, the organizations have made no attempt to directly engage the U.S.
government or to impact government-mandated reporting. Their frameworks were constructed and operate outside the
financial reporting system. As part of the larger field of corporate reporting, they maintain control of the framing of
ESG reporting exactly because they do not engage the government on this issue. 199 The U.S. government neither
recognizes nor contests the legitimacy of these groups because they do not attempt to use the government as a
mechanism for change. 200 Working outside the existing reporting system may have been a strategic choice on behalf
of the organizations, indicating distrust of the government as change agent. 201 But it may also signal a different
meaning, specifically, these organizations may have pursued a trajectory separate from financial reporting because
they view ESG reporting and financial reporting as separate parts of business. They did not try to bring the two
reporting fields together because they do not see them as connected. 202
Dissatisfaction with the lack of progress in improving ESG performance led some claimsmakers to question the
separation of financial and sustainability disclosure. 203 They saw the potential to tie ESG factors to firms’ financial
performance, and thus to leverage the power of capital markets for sustainability. 204 The missing link was that between
standards for financial disclosure and ESG factors. These claimsmakers identified the point of convergence between
ESG disclosure and financial disclosure as materiality. Providing more useful ESG information to investors could
foster an understanding of ESG impacts in those with the power to influence corporate behavior. But this would require
framing that incorporated TSC materiality and sustainability. Two key initiatives illustrate the potential for leveraging
the financial reporting regime to build a more complete definition of materiality.
3. The Convergence of Financial and Sustainability Information
The 2007 Petition seeking climate risk guidance from the SEC was the earliest effort to frame ESG reporting in the
language of the investing world, and to bridge the divide between ESG and financial disclosure. The coalition of
petitioners was an unlikely mix of financial and environmental groups. 205 However, the framing of their claims makes
plain the connection between the two camps, for the petition justified its request on the basis of investor protection. 206
198

See supra notes 92, 94–95, and accompanying text.
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As part of building this link to investor protection, the 2007 Petition based its arguments on the concept of materiality,
specifically citing the TSC Industries definition of the concept. 207 Throughout, the 2007 Petition returned to the idea
that climate change risk could be material, within the meaning used for financial reporting, and therefore subject to
disclosure. 208
While using the language of financial materiality may seem inconsequential, in fact, the Petition’s framing marked a
new trajectory for the social meaning of sustainability issues. It was the first time that a major sustainability effort
framed its work in the context and language of financial reporting. While the 2007 Petition was limited in scope to
climate risk information, it represents the first steps in changing the social meaning of sustainability issues from a
niche to a mainstream concern. This repositioning is evident in the fact that the investor Petitioners represented
mainstream investors. 209 Reframing the issues as financial, and working within the established legal infrastructure,
also provided the claimsmakers a mechanism to establish their legitimacy and set the stage for future claimsmaking
activities.
Claims for the Climate Guidance focused on a single topic, the impact of climate change on business. SASB viewed
sustainability more holistically, thinking across ESG impacts and across industries. 210 This broader framing challenges
the existing social meaning of materiality and creates greater opportunities to advance the cause of sustainability
through the materiality concept.”
SASB views its standards as driven by market demand for rigorous sustainability information, a demand driven by
investors. 211 SASB would take the awareness of the power of investors and capital markets and frame its claims in the
context of the financial world. SASB’s framing is straightforward: it sees the convergence of ESG reporting with
financial reporting and strives to integrate ESG KPIs into mainstream financial reporting. 212 For SASB, investors are
the main audience for SASB disclosure standards. 213 SASB’s argument to investors in support of convergence is that
traditional financial statements do not capture all factors that contribute to a firm’s ability to create value over time. 214
ESG accounting, coupled with financial accounting, provides a more complete view of material factors. 215 SASB
deepened the alignment with financial reporting by invoking the legal concept of the reasonable investor as defined
by securities law and specifically utilized the TSC definition of materiality, articulating the connection between ESG
factors and the disclosure required under SEC regulations. 216
The social meaning of SASB’s framing reflects a societal expectation that firms have not only ESG disclosure
responsibilities, but that they also have sustainability performance responsibilities. Thus, firms must change their
behavior and results on sustainability factors by connecting ESG factors with business performance. 217 The leverage
point for this operational change is investors, who need relevant and useful information on which to re-evaluate their
own decision-making on ESG factors. 218 SASB’s use of the TSC materiality definition as the basis for its standards

corporate performance or operations. 2007 Petition, supra note 96, at 45. This made it impossible for investors to utilize the disclosure in investment
decisions. Id. at 45, 48, 50.
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101 and 303 of the 10-K report. Id. at 15–20.
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demand from investors for information on how sustainability factors impact corporate value creation)(last visited April 27., 2019).
212
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reimagines the concept of materiality, incorporating material ESG factors with material financial factors to provide a
holistic picture of business performance. This convergence of financial and ESG reporting mirrors society’s
expectations for business.
Close alignment with the framing of financial reporting was key in attracting adherents to SASB’s work. The framing
of GRI, CDP, and the IIRC did not seem to be yielding much progress 219 SASB decided to look to the one party no
company can afford to ignore – its investors. To aid recruitment, SASB utilized two specific mechanisms. To begin
building connections and establishing credibility with the investor community, SASB leveraged key former
government officials and regulators. 220 SASB’s strategy seems to have been to build tiers of adherents, enlisting
specific first level supporters with ties to networks of potential second level supporters. In addition, both the
development of its Conceptual Framework, which sets out the basic concepts, principles, and definitions that guide
the standard-setting process, 221 and its industry-specific standards are multi-stakeholder processes. The public
comment periods on the Conceptual Framework provided the opportunity for potential adherents to engage in creating
SASB’s governance documents. 222 The process for creating the actual accounting standards provides even more
opportunities for engagement by both corporations and investors. 223 These multi-stakeholder processes serve as
mechanisms to foster greater alignment of frames between SASB and its main constituents.
SASB undoubtedly reaps rewards in the form of attracting supporters from aligning its framing with that of financial
reporting. However, this strategy also comes with a cost. SASB cannot directly control the meaning of the frame it
uses, since much of the context’s meaning is embedded in the legal infrastructure of mandatory financial reporting.
SASB is using a frame created and controlled by government (including the SEC and the courts), which makes the
crucial decisions on the concepts and contours of the reporting laws. The argument that the concept of materiality as
defined by securities laws includes ESG issues is SASB’s attempt to add further dimension to a frame controlled by
the government. SASB has foregone formal control over meaning for the sake of attracting supporters. By specifically
utilizing government-created structures (i.e., the 10-K report) and definition of materiality, SASB publicly contends
for influence over the meaning of materiality. SASB’s unique strategy is that it does not contest the governmentsanctioned definition. Rather, it attempts to transform our understanding of materiality in a way that runs contrary to
the SEC’s focus. This is a gamble that positions the organization for conflicts with government, especially since SEC
resistance to mandatory ESG disclosure remains high. 224
SASB has important strategy decisions to make in light of its own mission, investor demands, and government inaction
to improve sustainability reporting. To understand its strategy options and choices, we must first examine the
challenges, especially the institutional obstacles, to changing the social meaning of materiality.
III. Challenges to Changing Social Meaning
219
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As we saw in Section II, SASB defines success for itself as achieving the convergence of sustainability reporting with
financial reporting. 225 Success depends, therefore, on SASB re-making the social meaning of financial reporting to
include ESG factors. But changing social meaning can be problematic, especially where that meaning is embedded in
legal infrastructure. This section examines key conceptual and institutional barriers for SASB’s claimsmaking and
considers the ramifications for SASB’s CMA strategy.
A. The Inertia of Existing Social Meaning
Claimsmakers face a key obstacle in promoting change in the fact that social meanings are tenacious; acceptance of a
social meaning itself inhibits change of that very social meaning. 226 To create a new social meaning requires both
dismantling the old meaning and implementing a new meaning, increasing the collective action problem. 227 This
makes it is easier to defend an existing social meaning than to succeed in changing social meaning. 228
The power to create and change social meaning derives from concerted action. 229 Transformation of social meaning
is a social good that comes with attendant collective action problems. 230 Transforming social meaning requires that
claimsmakers achieve collective acceptance of the proposed new meaning from enough of society to make that new
meaning the dominant construction. 231 However, social meaning is not changed by fiat. Rather, claimsmakers must
work to change the incentives around adherence to the existing meaning to foster change. 232 Sunstein describes this
as creating a “norm bandwagon” – the condition where the costs of non-compliance with the new meaning are high
enough to induce acceptance of the meaning. 233 CMA can be seen as initiatives to change the cost of adherence to
new meanings by creating dissatisfaction with the existing social meaning of an action.
B. Institutional Barriers to Changing Social Meaning: The Power of Law
Significantly, law and government often play a crucial role in maintaining existing social meaning. Scholars have
recognized the power of law as an expression of values and norms, which drive expectations in a specific direction. 234
Thus, law, as a statement of values, affects social meaning. 235 The reality is that government and law are often acting
in support of an existing social meaning and orthodoxy. 236 The inherent power of law to maintain the status quo can
create institutional barriers to changing social meaning. Where the law puts its resources behind a specific social
meaning, there will be disincentives to challenging that meaning. But the law can go beyond merely defending
meaning on a rhetorical level and can create actual barriers to change in the form of specific legal infrastructure and
institutions.
Agencies have broad latitude in interpreting the statutes they administer and in crafting regulations, , each of which
presents challenges for advancing new conceptions of materiality. 237 In the field of corporate reporting, this gives the
SEC the ability to control much of the meaning of materiality, as well as focusing enforcement resources away from
ESG reporting. This deference can act as a barrier to change.
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Supreme Court jurisprudence is clear in limiting the power of the judiciary to review administrative agency actions
interpreting statutes that the agency administers. Where the statute is silent or ambiguous on a particular issue, the
court can review only whether the agency’s interpretation of the statute is a “permissible construction” of the
statute. 238 A court may not substitute its own interpretation of the statute, or its own policy preferences, for that of
the agency. 239 The Chevron Court viewed reconciliation of policy conflicts as part of the political process, for which
the judiciary was not suited. 240 Thus, courts may not second guess agency action, where the agency’s interpretation
of relevant statutes was a “reasonable choice within [the] gap left open by Congress.” 241
Similarly, agencies have broad discretion in creating regulations to implement statutory mandates. Generally, courts
are authorized to set aside agency actions found to be arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 242 However, the
scope of review of an action claimed to be arbitrary and capricious is narrow; courts are not permitted to substitute
their judgment for that of the agency. 243 In State Farm, the Supreme Court limited judicial review of agency
regulations to examining whether the agency considered relevant factors in its decision and whether there is a rational
connection between the facts found in agency proceedings and the regulations. 244 Judicial review under the arbitrary
and capricious standard, then, is largely to determine whether a regulation is procedurally defective as a result of flaws
in the agency’s decision-making process. 245 Where the agency has examined the relevant data and offers a “rational”
connection between the data and the regulations, the court must defer to the agency’s decision. 246
Under the Chevron and State Farm standards, the SEC has significant discretion to shape the contours of materiality.
The TSC definition of materiality is sufficiently broad to leave much of the elaboration of its meaning in the agency’s
hands. TSC materiality is based on two key concepts - the reasonable investor and the total mix of information –
neither of which was defined by the Court. 247 It is left to the SEC to define what constitutes a reasonable investor and
what is included in the total mix of information that investor desires. The SEC has considered reasonable investors to
be concerned with only the financial returns on their investments and to need only financial information to make
investment decisions. 248 Given the historical framing of financial reporting as focused solely on financial factors, this
definition is among the permissible constructions of materiality. Additionally, as the SEC evaluates the ramifications
of different interpretations, it could resolve policy tensions in favor of a policy to reduce burdens on business. As long
as there is evidence in the administrative record supporting this policy decision, the Chevron and State Farm standards
would protect the SEC’s determination from judicial overturning.
The judicial hands-off attitude represented by the standard of judicial review of agency actions means that agencies
retain power to control regulations but also to heavily influence the social meaning of regulatory arenas. The SEC’s
narrow focus on solely economic factors as impacting financial returns has led it to limit its conception of the total
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mix of information important to investors. This power to control agency framing has contributed to maintaining the
psychological and normative distinction between financial information and sustainability information. 249 Since agency
regulations need only have some degree of factual support, the SEC can largely ignore claims for policy revisions and
advances, further entrenching the existing social meaning. Limited judicial review of agency action also allows the
perpetuation of patterns of action or inaction. For example, the court in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
SEC, a 1979 case, noted favorably that the SEC had instituted additional proceedings related to expanding corporate
disclosure. 250 Since then, however, there has been essentially no change in the SEC’s position on corporate
sustainability reporting. The question becomes whether this lack of change accurately reflects society’s expectations
or whether it reflect the inertia of the existing orthodoxy.
The deferential standard of judicial review of agency action is only one part of the legal infrastructure that can be used
to entrench the status quo. Agency control of enforcement resources can also serve to hamper change, as is evident
with implementation of the 2010 Climate Guidance. The teeth of any regulatory scheme is in adequate and effective
enforcement, without which compliance will be viewed as discretionary. In the context of required disclosure, this
may mean that reporting entities view non-disclosure as low risk and, therefore, decide not to disclose.
The years following promulgation of the 2010 Climate Guidance reflect the dynamic between disclosure and
enforcement. The SEC’s follow-up to the Guidance was generally muted, 251 and promised support for reporting
entities, in the form of SEC-sponsored disclosure roundtables, never materialized. A study of post-Guidance climate
disclosure revealed the rather dismal disclosure and enforcement landscape. 252 The study found that, while there had
been an increase in the quantity of climate-related disclosure immediately following issuance of the Guidance, this
figure reflected that more companies were mentioning climate in their annual reports, generally, climate disclosures
had decreased in quality, consisting mostly of broad, vague statements and boilerplate language. 253 Where disclosure
is sub-par, one might expect to see the agency institute aggressive enforcement. However, this has not been the case.
Of the more than 45,000 enforcement letters issued in the study’s time period, only 52 of those letters contained
questions on Guidance-related disclosure. 254 Enforcement since the Ceres study seems to have remained lax. A New
York Times article in 2016 reported the efforts of a loose coalition of investors, including representatives of large
pension funds, and 35 members of Congress to catalyze the SEC’s enforcement actions. 255 The SEC, the article
reported, had no plans to require companies to improve their disclosure on climate change risk. 256
The SEC’s pattern of lax enforcement of the 2010 Climate Guidance sends a clear message to reporting companies:
the agency does not find the issue of climate change important enough to allocate enforcement resources toward the
Guidance. Lax enforcement may also indicate that the agency retains its blindspot on the connection between
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environmental factors and financial performance, that it does not accept that climate change factors can meet the
definition of materiality for purposes of disclosure. By taking a hands-off enforcement approach, the SEC supports
the pre-Guidance status quo, where environmental and financial information were distinct and separate.
IV. Implications for SASB’s Strategy
SASB’s decision to frame its claims for corporate reporting in line with the legal structure for mandatory reporting
forces the issue of the social meaning of reporting as no other claimsmaker in the reporting movement has. As we
have seen, however, the SEC has made no significant change in mandatory reporting since it issued the Climate
Guidance in 2010. Spector and Kitsuse’s natural history model hypothesizes a late stage where claimsmakers grow
dissatisfied with government action on their claims. 257 For SASB, this stage involves evaluating whether the current
definition of materiality meets its investor protection goals. The escalation of SASB activities is evidence of SASB’s
continuing dissatisfaction with the lack of convergence between financial and sustainability reporting. 258
Discontent with government action raises the question implicit in the natural history model: what are claimsmaking
strategy options, in light of government inadequacy? Spector and Kitsuse’s model investigates this space where the
claimsmaker decides to reject formal processes, finding it no longer possible to work within the system. 259 Some
aspects of SASB’s situation fit within the boundaries of this stage, but SASB has also acted in ways that question
some of the model’s assertions. To some extent, SASB can be seen as rejecting aspects of the formal processes
available to it. SASB seems to have learned lessons from the previous failed attempts to use legal processes to force
the SEC to expand corporate disclosure, failures that are connected directly to the realities of the formal agency
processes. The SEC’s control over the legal structure of mandatory reporting and the power it wields as an
administrative agency give it formal control over the social meaning of materiality. While the same processes are still
available to SASB, they are not necessarily the best strategy to attempt meaning change and SASB seems to know
this. Rather than a complete rejection of engagement with formal processes, as Spector & Kitsuse hypothesize, SASB
pursues a hybrid strategy, one where it burns no bridges with those currently officially controlling reporting, but also
does not surrender to the system.
At Spector and Kitsuse’s final stage, claimsmakers have given up on government action as a solution to their claims
and begin to raise claims that challenge the legitimacy of the established institutions. 260 Rather than completely reject
all connections with the regulator, SASB continues to participate in available government-sanctioned activities related
to corporate reporting. In 2016, the SEC issued a concept release as part of its normal rule-making procedures. 261
Among other topics, the concept release included questions on updating disclosure requirements relating to
“sustainability matters.” 262 SASB submitted extensive written comments to the concept release, 263 as well as
participating in meetings on the concept release conducted by the SEC Investor Advisory Committee. 264 These
activities demonstrate that SASB remains ready to fully engage in with formal regulatory processes. SASB also

257

SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 134, at 151.
For example, in 2017 SASB constituted its inaugural SASB Standards Board, with overall responsibility for SASB standard-setting process.
Announcing New Members of the SASB Standards Board, PR NEWSWIRE (May 11, 2017), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/announcingnew-members-of-the-sasb-standards-board-300455499.html. SASB has issued disclosure standards for 77 industries. See supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
259
SPECTOR & KITSUSE, supra note 134, at 153.
260
Id.
261
Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, 81 Fed. Reg. 23916 (April 22, 2016) [hereinafter SEC Concept Release]. The
concept release was intended to seek public comment on modernizing specified business and financial disclosure requirements in Regulation S-K.
Press Release, SEC Solicits Public Comment on Business and Financial Disclosure Requirements in Regulation S-K, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N (April
15, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-70.html.
262
SEC Concept Release, supra note 258, at 23969-23973. The Request for Comment on sustainability items included questions related to
identification of specific issues of important to investors, the advisability of creating line item disclosure requirements, and use of existing
sustainability reporting frameworks. Id. at 213–15.
263
Response to Concept Release on Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (July
1, 2016)., available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-25.pdf.
264
Minutes of the Meeting on July 14, 2016, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac071416minutes.htm (last visited Apr. 27, 2019)(identifying SASB CEO Jean Rogers as a panelist for the discussion of sustainability reporting). For the
text of Rogers’ remarks, see Remarks to the SEC Investor Advisory Committee, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BD. (July 14, 2016), available
at https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-28/26528-265.pdf. The Investor Advisory Committee was created in 2011 by the Dodd-Frank Act to advise
the SEC on various regulatory matters. Investor Advisory Committee, SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisorycommittee.shtml (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).
258

26

This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online at American
Business Law Journal, published by Wiley on behalf of The American Business Law Journal and the Academy of Legal Studies in Business.
Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1111/ablj.12148

maintains less formal ties to relevant regulatory bodies: the organization’s Board of Directors includes two former
SEC chairs and a former chair of FASB. 265 This strategy of engagement in formal processes makes sense, given
SASB’s overarching desire for convergence of financial and sustainability reporting. 266
At the same time that SASB avails itself of opportunities in formal government processes, it clearly is not counting
on immediate SEC action to expand corporate reporting, nor is it waiting for the SEC to reevaluate the concept of
materiality. Spector and Kitsuse argue that, when claimsmakers reject government action, they focus on the creation
of alternatives. 267 At this stage, the model posits an either/or choice between two possible strategies. One possibility
is for a claimsmaker to withdraw from the existing institutional system and create an alternative that provides a limited
resolution of some of their claims. 268 To a certain extent, SASB’s reporting standards reflect this approach. Companies
can use the standards to report sustainability impacts without the SEC’s formal approval and, in fact, outside of the
financial reporting system. SASB’s standards, thus, can be seen as answering a limited portion of SASB’s claims.
SASB has seen the potential of pursuing both this and the second alternative posed by the model: create an alternative
institution to develop a social and political base for challenging the existing procedures. 269 SASB seeks to change the
social meaning of materiality by building an alternative that meshes with the expectations and view of reality of
potential supporters better than does the existing system. In this process, SASB utilizes a unique feature of information
disclosure systems. Unlike substantive regulation, where only the agency can alter the regulations, an information
disclosure system has a leverage point other than the regulator – i.e., the end user of the information. SASB appeals
directly to the intended beneficiary of the U.S. financial reporting system, investors, as potential adherents to SASB’s
framing of materiality and uses a market mechanism to change the social meaning of the concept.
SASB’s drive toward the convergence of financial and ESG disclosure answers much of the dissatisfaction expressed
by investors with the existing reporting regime. 270 Further, the convergence of financial and sustainability factors
reflects evolving societal norms that are driving changes in investing. The growth of fossil fuel divestment
campaigns, 271 increases in shareholder resolutions on environmental and social issues, 272 and spreading environmental
activism 273 are all indications of society’s interest in key ESG issues. Societal norms and investor desire to incorporate
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ESG factors into financial analysis and decisions change the incentives for firms’ conception of materiality. Adherence
to the legal definition of materiality may impact a firm’s access to capital, as investors pressure firms to disclose
material ESG information, regardless of whether the SEC requires such disclosure or not. 274
SASB standards operate as soft law, but without the key drawback to soft law mechanisms: lack of accountability. 275
Investor involvement and demand for use of SASB’s reporting standards should mitigate accountability issues, as
investors have the financial power to expect improved ESG disclosure. Creation of an alternative reporting construct,
even as soft law, changes the context of reporting by showing how sustainability impacts are material. Leveraging the
existing legal architecture of reporting reduces some of the cost of changing meaning: since it is an architecture with
which reporting companies and investors are familiar, there is less uncertainty than in a completely new reporting
framework. While SASB does not appear to want to supplant the SEC itself, its effort to add dimension to the definition
of materiality is intended to become the accepted institutional frame for dialogue around corporate reporting, thereby
changing the social meaning of reporting. 276 SASB’s reporting standards are not so much an alternative as a companion
process with the potential to alter actual reporting practice by bringing the concept of materiality in line with new
expectations. 277
Aside from government resistance to the evolving social meaning of sustainability, SASB’s main challenge is the
potential limitation of framing sustainability in line with the TSC materiality definition. Financial reporting may be an
effective engine to drive some aspects of the sustainability movement forward, but it may stall where investor and
societal expectations and interests diverge. Investors, for example, may elect not to push for changes in corporate
behavior, leaving externalities in place. 278 SASB seems to recognize this potential limitation and refrains from
claiming that it is the sole avenue to advance sustainability. 279 What is clear from the slow progress of the sustainability
movement to date is that no significant progress will be made without aligning investor interests and sustainability.
Insofar as SASB frames materiality in the context of mainstream investor concerns, it should serve as a critical step
in advancing sustainability.
Conclusion
Although materiality would appear to be a simple concept as originally conceived, the story of its development shows
it to be anything but simple. As societal expectations of business increased to environmental and social impacts, the
definition of materiality became contested. The division between financial and ESG factors ill-served key
stakeholders, especially investors and society in general, because it largely failed to foster change in corporate
behavior toward greater sustainability.
Pursuing the convergence of financial and sustainability factors and disclosure is a step forward to bringing
sustainability into the mainstream. But this convergence requires leveraging the definition of financial materiality.
Despite calls for the SEC to use its authority to act on ESG disclosure, 280 action in the foreseeable future seems
unlikely. Absent government action, SASB has taken on the task of bringing financial materiality into the twenty-first
century by recognizing the impact environmental, social, and governance factors have on financial performance.
SASB’s work to alter the social meaning of materiality – to build a model that merges ESG and financial factors – has
the potential to harness the power of investors to advance sustainability into mainstream corporate practice.
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